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Editor’s Note
This issue of Space & Defense builds on
our initiative to explore broader questions of
political economy on the technological frontier of
defense policy. The lead feature by Armin
Krishnan, “Attack on the Brain: Neurowars and
Neurowarfare,” lays the groundwork for a new
specialty field of defense studies. In the world of
engineering and technology, advances in brain
mapping, information science, and
nanotechnology have prompted a convergence of
traditional research programs in biology,
chemistry, materials science, and electrical
engineering. This synthesis creates a crisis in the
sense that investments we make now might bring
a rich harvest of new products that spur economic
development, revolutionize health care, and play
an important role in expanding the quotient of
human happiness during the twenty-first century;
at the same time, as in the prominent cases of
nuclear, cyber, and space technologies, devices
for mastering a new domain, in this case the
collective mind of an army or its sponsoring
society, could lead to catastrophic conflict.
Krishnan argues we have already reached the
point where many staple concepts from
International Security—offense, defense,
deterrence, civil-military relations, crisis, and
war—are quite relevant to neurowarfare. He
urges us to apply our strategic reasoning now and
with great care if the international community as a
whole is to successfully manage challenges and
reap the benefits of expanding neuro-technology.
Our second and third features continue our series
of articles on the significance of space for
developing countries. The previous issue of
Space and Defense included a discussion of
Argentina space, remarking on the steadfastness
of that country’s technological effort to build
indigenous launch capability in spite of dramatic
swings across elections in ideology of political
leadership as well as Argentina’s economic
fortunes. In this volume, Gills Vilar Lopes,
“Brazil Space: Military Dependency and the Case
of the Geostationary Satellite for Defense and
Strategic Communications,” is not so sanguine
about the future of Brazil’s space program while

this rising power enters a period of political
turbulence and stagnant economic growth. Lopes
explores as a critical case Brazil’s Geostationary
Satellite for Defense and Strategic
Communications (SGDC). For him, space
becomes something of a political football as
Brazil’s civilian space agency (AEB) and its
Ministry of Science and Technology (MCT)
cannot muster the necessary fiscal or intellectual
capacity to establish autonomy from Brazil
space’s Air Force (FAB) heritage. Certainly,
military and civilian agencies must work together
to move forward, but he notes that the “Strategic”
qualifier of SGDC’s satellite communications has
as much to do with Brazil’s national development
as it does with strategic launchers for national
defense. Brazil itself will survive current
presidential scandals and eventually restore its
growth in export revenues, but neither SGDC nor
efforts to recover from the Alcântara launcher
disaster of 2003 will amount to much until the
government finds a way to reform its civilmilitary legacy on space.
Mónica Casalet’s feature contribution takes us
from Brazil to Latin America’s other rising power,
Mexico, in particular the fast growing, centrally
located state of Querétaro, north of Mexico City.
“Meeting Growth Challenges of Mexico
Aerospace: The Queretaro Cluster” expertly
dissects Mexico’s effort at the regional level of
analysis, working with Mexico’s federal system of
governance and drawing strength from high-level
national support as well as city-based
concentrations of talent. In a political context
almost the obverse of Brazil’s, Mexico’s
commercial sector seeks entry into the global
aerospace market with only a very faint presence
of home military demand for space products and
services. At this time, Mexico’s maturing
democracy also wrestles with fast rising societal
demand emerging from conditions of stark
inequality (the “two Mexicos” thesis). Casalet
argues that under sharp material constraints,
institutional networking and soft connections
among businesses, civil associations, multiple
levels of government, and universities—anchored
at the regional level—are far from epiphenomenal.

Indeed, they merit greater attention from analysts
as a critical factor in international political
economy & development, especially for multi-use
industrial sectors on the frontier of knowledge &
technology.
In addition to our peer-reviewed feature articles,
readers of this issue will enjoy topical essays from
the leadership of the Eisenhower Center at
USAFA. Director Deron Jackson reviews a
popular new primer on the international politics of
space, Crowded Orbits: Conflict and Cooperation
in Space (Columbia University Press, 2014), by
Professor Clay Moltz of the Naval Postgraduate
School, Monterey, California, and in the latest
edition of Publisher’s Corner, Ambassador Roger
Harrison asks whether diplomats confronting
today’s challenges from rising powers can find
positive inspiration for a SALT moment in space
arms control.
Following our recent space panel at ISA-Atlanta,
“Prospects for Peace on the Final Frontier,” it is
clear our journal, Space & Defense, is not alone
calling for new thinking in anticipation of greater
political and economic interaction, among both
state and non-state actors, in increasingly crowded
orbits. Professor Daniel Deudney, in Atlanta,

conjured the term “planetary politics” to remind
us of how moves made as far away as
geostationary orbit, at an altitude of some 23,000
miles, can have large-scale political effects here
on earth. Rather than politics in a new domain,
Deudney conjured us to think in terms of a
tightly-coupled, highly interactive system of
global actors on the surface expanding their menu
of political options out to geostationary range. In
addition to inviting readers to correspond with us
regarding controversies raised by our articles, we
at Space & Defense renew our call for papers that
refine our perspective on planetary politics. If our
readers are working new submissions that address
space arms control, commercial-military alliances
for national security, hypersonics, missile defense,
cyber deterrence, and preventive commercialmilitary regimes for cyber security, we encourage
them to send their contributions for peer review to
the Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense
Studies, U.S. Air Force Academy.

`

Damon Coletta
USAFA
April 2016

Article

Attack on the Brain: Neurowars and Neurowarfare
Armin Krishnan
Is neurotechnology leading nation-states toward a new domain of war?
Neuroscience is on the verge of
deciphering the human brain.1 As a result, brains
will become a part of the battlefield against which
attacks will be directed.2 As neuroscientist James
Giordano argued: “the brain is the next
battlespace.”3 It is foreseeable that this will have
tremendous implications for warfare and could
amount to a true military revolution in the sense
of military historian Williamson Murray: it would
completely change the characteristics of conflict,
as well as transform state and society.4
Neuroscience will lead to the development of
‘neuroweapons,’ which can remotely manipulate
mental states, emotions, perceptions, thinking, and
behavior of adversaries. As argued by Vladimir
Putin, “[s]uch high-tech weapons systems will be
comparable in effect to nuclear weapons, but will
be more acceptable in terms of political and
military ideology.”5 In a coming age of
neurowarfare traditional military conflict may no
longer take place or may become ancillary to the
goal of psychologically manipulating or
subverting enemy leaders and even entire societies.
States and other actors could be coerced with no
1

Armin Krishnan is Assistant Professor for Security
Studies, East Carolina University, Greenville, NC.
2
Laura Sanders, “Brains May Be War’s
Battlegrounds,” Science News 180 (2011): 14.
3
Tim Requarth, “This Is Your Brain. This Is Your
Brain as a Weapon,” Foreign Policy (September/
October), http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/09/14/this-isyour-brain-this-is-your-brain-as-a-weapon-darpa-dualuse-neuroscience/ (accessed September 18, 2015).
4
Williamson Murray, “Thinking about Revolutions in
Military Affairs,” Joint Forces Quarterly (Summer
1997): 71.
5
Christopher Leake and Will Stewart, “Putin Targets
Foes with ‘Zombie’ Gun Which Attacks Victim’s
Central Nervous System,” The Daily Mail, March 31,
2012, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article2123415/Putin-targets-foes-zombie-gun-attackvictims-central-nervous-system.html (accessed
September 8, 2015).

resort to open violence and conflicts could be
suppressed before they can ever break out. At the
same time, neurotechnologies and sophisticated
methods of psychological influencing could also
be used offensively against enemy societies with
the goal of “collapsing the enemy internally rather
than physically destroying him.”6 In the worst
case, neuroscience and neurotechnolgies (neuro
S/T) could be abused for torture, genocide, and
high-tech repression. The ethical implications of
brain and mind manipulation are inescapable and
would require a wider debate.
However, the purpose of this paper is to introduce
the concept of neurowarfare in its two basic
meanings: 1) the application of neuro S/T to
warfare and security and 2) neurowarfare as war
in ‘neurospace’, an emerging and distinctive
domain of war, where combat may take place and
victory may be achieved. The paper will therefore
outline some of the neuro S/T applications
relevant to war and conflict. Secondly it will
sketch and define the new emerging domain of
war. Finally, it is argued that a neurowarfare
strategy is needed for coming to terms with issues
relating to targeting, deterrence, and threshold to
war, before neuroweapons are introduced.
MILITARY NEUROSCIENCE
Military brain and behavioral research
goes back to at least the 1920s and dramatically
expanded in the U.S. in the 1950s because of the
desire to understand Communist brainwashing
and to develop methods that surpassed those of
the Communist mind programmers. The
Artichoke/ MK ULTRA documents of the early
1950s to the early 1960s leave no doubt that the
CIA and the U.S. military aimed for the hypnotic
6

William S. Lind, Keith Nightengale, John F. Schmitt,
Joseph W. Sutton, and Gary I. Wilson, “The Changing
Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation,” Marine
Corps Gazette 73 (1989): 23.
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and physical control of enemy minds, both in the
context of intelligence operations as well as in
‘psychochemical’ warfare operations directed
against entire societies.7 Although these efforts
were apparently not particularly successful, there
has been since 2001 in the aftermath of 9/11 a
renewed interest by DARPA and other agencies to
develop and leverage brain research for the
national security sector. This was also encouraged
by new brain imaging technology developed and
perfected in the 1990s, such as fMRIs, that have
given neuroscientists unprecedented insights into
the processes occurring inside a living human
brain.
Bioethicist Jonathan Moreno drew attention to the
topic of military neuroscience through his 2006
book Mind Wars, which also discussed some of
the related ethical issues.8 Since then the DIA
commissioned a National Research Council study
on military applications of neuroscience research
in 2008 and the U.S. Army commissioned another
study on neuroscience opportunities for the Army
in 2009.9 This was followed by a Royal Society
study on Neuroscience, Conflict and Security
published in 2012.10 These studies mostly
highlighted potential contributions of neuro S/T to
human enhancement, strategic intelligence,
security and interrogation, and neuroscientific
methods of influencing an adversary. In 2013
Special Operations Command (SOCOM)
announced the creation of a Center for Excellence
in Operational Neuroscience at Yale University,
7

U.S. Congress, “Project MKULTRA, the CIA’s
Program of Research in Behavioral Modification,”
Joint Hearing Before the Select Committee on
Intelligence and the Subcommittee on Health and
Scientific Research of the Committee on Human
Resources, United States Senate, Ninety-Fifth
Congress, August 3, 1977, Appendices, pp. 65-171.
8
Jonathan Moreno, Mind Wars: Brain Research and
National Defense (New York: Dana Press, 2006).
9
National Research Council, Emerging Cognitive
Neuroscience and Related Technologies (Washington,
DC: National Academies Press, 2008); National
Research Council, Opportunities in Neuroscience for
Future Army Applications (Washington, DC: National
Academies Press, 2009).
10
; Royal Society, Brain Waves Module 3:
Neuroscience, Conflict and Security (London: The
Royal Society, 2012).

which did not go ahead because of the controversy
over using neuroscience research for interrogation
and the ‘ethical risks’ inherent to such research.11
However, it is mostly civilian academic and
commercial research that is currently driving the
advancement of neuroscience. President Obama
announced the American BRAIN Initiative in
April 2013 that aims to revolutionize our
understanding of the brain. The President
explained that it will be a long-term scientific
effort comparable to the human genome project
and that it could impact “the lives of not millions,
but billions of people on this planet.”12 The plan is
to spend $100 million dollars in federal money
and $200 million dollars in private sector money
on neuroscience research for ten years. The
project will be led by the National Institutes of
Health, the National Science Foundation, and
DARPA in conjunction with private sector
partners such as the Allen Institute for Brain
Science, the Howard Hughes Medical Institute,
the Kavli Foundation, and the Salk Institute for
Biological Studies.13 According to the White
House:
The BRAIN Initiative will
accelerate the development and
application of new technologies
that will enable researchers to
produce dynamic pictures of the
brain that show how individual
brain cells and complex neural
circuits interact at the speed of
thought. These technologies will
open new doors to explore how
the brain records, processes, uses,
stores, and retrieves vast
quantities of information, and
shed light on the complex links

11

Roy Eidelson, “Neuroscience, Special Forces and
Yale,” Counterpunch, March 6, 2013,
http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/03/06/neuroscience
-special-forces-and-yale/ (accessed August 28, 2015).
12
White House, “Fact Sheet: BRAIN Initiative,” Press
Release, April 2, 2013,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/04/02/fact-sheet-brain-initiative (accessed
August 28, 2015).
13
T.R. Insel, S.C. Landis, and F.S. Collins, “The
BRAIN Initiative,” Science 340 (2013): 687-688.
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between brain function and
behavior.14
This neuroscience funding comes on top of the
normal research funding in related disciplines and
commercial research funded by major
corporations in the health and IT/ communications
sectors. The great importance of private sector
research is indicated by the tremendous growth in
neuroscience patents that are mostly filed by
corporations. In 2010 alone 800 neurotechnology
patents have been filed – a doubling of patents per
year from the previous decade. Interestingly, most
patents were filed by the marketing research
company Nielsen (100) and by software giant
Microsoft (89), which shows that neurotechnology
has already gone beyond medical applications and
is poised to proliferate across society.15
Similar efforts of ‘unlocking the brain’ are
underway across the world. For example, the
European Union has inaugurated a similar
neuroscience research effort called the Human
Brain Project (HBP) in October 2013. The EU
pledged to spend €1 billion euros over ten years to
“gain fundamental insights into what it means to
be human, develop new treatments for brain
diseases, and build revolutionary new Information
and Communications Technologies (ICT).”16
Canada has joined the race with an announcement
of dedicating $100 million dollars over five years
to brain research.17 In 2014 Japan launched the
Brain/ MINDS Initiative, which also seeks to map
the brain.18 Overall, it has been estimated that
14

White House, “Fact Sheet.”
A. Griffin, “Patents for Technology to Read People’s
Minds Hugely Increasing,” The Independent, May 8,
2015, http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgetsand-tech/news/patents-for-technology-to-read-peoplesminds-hugely-increasing-10236211.html (accessed
August 28, 2015).
16
Henry Markram, “The Human Brain Project: A
Report to the European Commission,” Human Brain
Project, April 2012,
https://www.humanbrainproject.eu/documents/10180/1
7648/TheHBPReport_LR.pdf/18e5747e-10af-4bec9806-d03aead57655 (accessed August 28, 2015).
17
“Ontario Leading Brain Research,” Office of the
Prime Minister, Press Release, March 5, 2013,
http://news.ontario.ca/opo/en/2013/03/ontario-leadingbrain-research.html (accessed December 12, 2014).
18
Requart, “This Is Your Brain.”
15

6

public and private sector neuro S/T investment is
around $150 billion annually worldwide.19 Most
worryingly, it is projected that Asia and South
America will outspend the United States and its
western allies by 2020.20 Neuro S/T could
proliferate to nonstate actors, including criminal
organizations, terrorist groups, and even
individuals, and may result in novel security and
criminal threats.21
What follows is an overview of some of the
applications and technologies that have the
greatest potential for usage in war and conflict. It
is important to keep in mind that neuro S/T has
numerous civilian applications, ranging from
medical/ health applications to recreation and
enhancement to name a few. The technology will
spread quickly across societies and create like the
Internet a new arena or battleground where
conflict will take place. The Royal Society report
suggested dividing military applications of neuro
S/T into two primary types: performance
enhancement and performance degradation, which
will be used, here, as a basic structure.22 Of course,
all enhancement technologies can be in principle
also used for degradation.
ENHANCEMENT TECHNOLOGIES
A major UK Ministry of Defence
assessment of global trends speculated that “A
range of technological enhancements have the
potential to transform human identity by
improving sensory perception, physical
performance and perhaps even giving us the
ability to control fear and other emotional

19

Sarah Canna, “Leveraging Neuroscientific and
Neurotechnological Developments with a Focus on
Influence and Deterrence in a Networked World,”
Carnegie Endowment Neurodeterrence Workshop,
October 18, 2013,
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/U_NeuroDeterrenc
e_Workshop_Approved_for_Public_Release_31Jan14v
2.pdf (accessed November 6, 2014).
20
Ibid.
21
M. Goodman, Future Crimes: Everything Is
Connected, Everything Is Vulnerable and What We
Can Do About It (New York: DoubleDay, 2015), pp.
261-288.
22
Royal Society, Brainwaves Module 3: III.

7

Space & Defense

states.”23 In the future, military commanders may
have the ability to monitor and control the mental
states of their soldiers, who may be able through
enhancements to perform well without rest for
days, to manage their emotions under stress, and
to respond faster and smarter to emerging threats.
There are three basic approaches to enhancement
that seem to be particularly promising:
neuropharmacology, brain stimulation, and braincomputer interfaces. It seems a foregone
conclusion that enhancement technologies would
spread quickly beyond the military and across
societies that emphasize competitiveness and
individual achievement.
Neuropharmacology
Throughout history, militaries have drugged their
soldiers to keep them happy, to master their fear,
to keep them awake, and to make them better able
to endure gruesome conditions. Most militaries
used alcohol, caffeine, and nicotine, Yemeni and
Somali tribesmen chewed khat, and Prussian
soldiers were given cocaine in the late 19th century.
The Nazis infamously put amphetamine under the
brand name Pervitin into chocolate and handed
them out to soldiers to make them fearless and
more energetic, while Nazi leaders such as Hitler
and Goering took amphetamines for better coping
with the stress of decision-making in war.24 The
U.S. Air Force has handed out ‘go pills’ (e.g.
Dexedrine) to pilots since World War II. The
concept of military drug use for performance
enhancement is therefore nothing new, but it has
certainly become more controversial. In recent
times there has been growing concern over the
routine non-treatment medication of U.S. soldiers,
which has already resulted in some tragic lapses
of judgment, apart from the other obvious
problems associated with the long-term use of
pharmaceuticals such as addiction and permanent
damage to the soldiers’ health.25
23

“Global Strategic Trends – Out to 2045,” London,
UK Ministry of Defence, 2014, p. 83.
24
Mick Farren, Speed-Speed-Speedfreak: A Fast
History of Amphetamine (Port Townsend, WA: Feral
House, 2010), pp. 22-51.
25
Kim Murphy, “A Fog of Drugs and War,” Los
Angeles Times, April 7, 2012,
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/apr/07/nation/la-naarmy-medication-20120408 (accessed December 29,
2014).

The hope is that neuroscience will develop new
drugs that are both far more effective and also
safer than the ones that currently exist, which
would also make the medication of soldiers with
psychotropic drugs more acceptable.
Neuroscientists have gained over the last decades
an excellent understanding of brain chemistry,
which has already led to the development of many
new psychotropic drugs such as Prozac, first
approved by the FDA in 1987. Researchers hope
to not only cure depression, PTSD, and other
mental disorders but to ultimately enhance mental
capabilities through so-called nootropic drugs and
special nutrition that can improve memory,
cognitive functions, motivation, and attention.26
Better computer models based on new methods of
neuroimaging could enable researchers to better
predict the effects of certain drugs on the brain.
Greater precision of drug delivery to specific
areas of the brain could also produce very precise
psychological and behavioral effects.
Nanotechnologies could deliver drugs across the
blood-brain barrier and make drugs more
effective.27
One particular cognitive enhancement drug that is
currently being reviewed by several militaries
around the world is modafinil. The drug has
already been approved by the FDA for treating
narcolepsy and sleep disorders (known under the
brand name Provigil). What makes modafinil
especially interesting for armed forces is its
feature of improving alertness and wakefulness
instead of merely suppressing tiredness.28 Other
drugs could reduce stress or anxiety and make it
thereby also less likely that soldiers will suffer
from PTSD at some later point. Roger Pitman
from Harvard University uses the beta-blocker
propranolol for suppressing the formation of
painful memories of veterans.29 Soldiers could be
26

Kenneth Ford and Clark Glymour, “The Enhanced
Warfighter,” The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 1
(2014): 43-53.
27
National Research Council, Emerging Cognitive
Neuroscience and Related Technologies, p. 5.
28
Richard Martin, “It’s Wake-Up Time,” Wired 11.11,
November 2003,
http://archive.wired.com/wired/archive/11.11/sleep_pr.
html (accessed December 12, 2014).
29
Moreno, Mind Wars, p. 152.
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medicated through implanted chips that release a
variety of drugs directly into the brain and the
drug release could be activated in response to a
measured brain state or through a wireless remote
signal. A Massachusetts company has already
patented such a drug release chip that can be
inserted through a tiny whole in the skull via a
syringe.30
Brain Stimulation
The idea of electrical brain stimulation for
therapeutic purposes is also not new. Medical
doctors and psychiatrists have used the electrical
stimulation of the brain for treating mental
illnesses since the 18th century, with
electrotherapy becoming popular in psychiatry in
the late 19th century.31 The modern
electroconvulsive therapy, in which an electrical
current is applied to the brain through electrodes,
has been widely used since the 1940s and 1950s.
Despite its frequent portrayal as a cruel form of
treatment in popular culture, the American
Psychiatric Association considers it safe and
effective for treating major depression,
schizophrenia, and bipolar disorders.32 Since the
early 1980s psychiatrists have developed newer
methods for electrically stimulating the brain.
The Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS)
method applies strong electromagnetic fields of
thousands of volts through a helmet-like device
above the brain to activate specific brain regions.
TMS has shown promise in terms of treating
depression and other mental disorders, but there
are still some concerns for the safety of the
treatment.33 TMS might improve cognitive
functions, alleviate pain, and reduce the need for
sleep. TMS has been demonstrated to enable
external control of a person’s hand movements by
stimulating the motor cortex and to enable the
transmission of simple information encoded in
30

Rob Matheson, “Deal Reached to Commercialize
Microchip Drug-Delivery Implant,” Tech Swarm, June
29, 2015, http://www.techswarm.com/2015/06/dealreached-to-commercialize-microchip.html (accessed
August 28, 2015).
31
Adam Keiper, “The New Age of Neuroelectrics,”
The New Atlantis, 2006 (Winter): 6.
32
Robert H. Blank, Intervention in the Brain: Politics,
Policy, and Ethics (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), p. 27.
33
Ibid.: 30.
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Morse code directly into the brain.34 The
downside of TMS is that it requires a large coil
and power source, which are difficult to
miniaturize and to make portable. TMS can also
not reach deeper areas of the brain and may
therefore only have some limited medical
applications.
Other brain stimulation methods include
transcranial Direct Current Stimulation (tDCS)
and Transcranial Pulsed Ultrasound Stimulation:
both might be suitable for integration into a
soldier’s combat helmet and are therefore of
particular interest to the military. tDCS applies a
weak current through electrodes to the scalp,
which has shown to significantly increase
concentration and cognitive capabilities in test
subjects.35 The U.S. Air Force has already tested
“external stimulant technology to enable the
airman to maintain focus on aerospace tasks and
to receive and process greater amounts of
operationally relevant information” and has found
that “it can help pilots better pick out targets from
radar images.”36
Researchers from Arizona State University are
already working on a Transcranial Pulsed
Ultrasound device that can be fitted into a helmet
and that could be used for controlling the mental
34

R. Rao, A. Stocco, M. Bryan, D. Sarma, T.M.
Youngquist, J. Wu and C.S. Prat, “A Direct Brain-toBrain Interface in Humans,” PLOS One 10.137 (2014);
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and G. Ruffini, “Conscious Brain-to-Brain
Communication in Humans Using Non-Invasive
Technologies,” PLOS One 10.1371 (2014).
35
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36
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Hacking Is Having Incredible Effects and It Is Just
Getting Started,” Business Insider, August 16, 2014,
https://www.yahoo.com/tech/brain-hacking-is-havingincredible-effects-and-its-94844111639.html (accessed
December 29, 2014).

9

Space & Defense

states of soldiers, boosting alertness, and relieving
pain from injuries.37 The pulsed ultrasound would
be also able to reach deeper regions of the brain.
Brain stimulation methods could have numerous
benefits in terms of treatment and enhancement
for people across society, and the technology
could spread very quickly as indicated by the
great commercial success of a tDCS device called
Foc.us that is being marketed as a ‘gaming
device.’38
Brain-Computer Interfaces
The ultimate goal in the development of neural
devices is to build a brain-computer interface that
enables a person to receive information from a
computer or device, as well as transmit
information from the brain to a computer either as
a computer input device or for controlling
machinery. Primitive BCIs already exist. They
come in two varieties: invasive BCIs that require
implanting an electrode or chip into the brain and
non-invasive BCIs that rely on measurements
taken from outside the head.
The great pioneer of BCIs was Yale scientist Jose
Delgado, who implanted animals and also some
humans with a device he called ‘stimoceiver’ in
the late 1960s. The stimoceiver enabled Delgado
to very reliably trigger behaviors bypassing
conscious decision-making by electrically
stimulating a particular area of the brain, although
he admitted that the method was generally
incapable of programming new behaviors.39 Of
course, invasive methods as used by Delgado are
ethically highly controversial: they could
permanently affect human personality and require
medically risky procedures. For this reason
37
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38
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December 12, 2014).
39
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invasive BCIs can currently only be considered
for purely therapeutical purposes that treat an
existing medical condition. For example, currently
under development by DARPA is Deep Brain
Stimulation (DBS) based on implanted microchips
that function as pacemakers for the brain of
Parkinson’s disease patients and for individuals
suffering from PTSD. About 100,000 patients
have up to now received DBS implants, and
DARPA has recently made $70 million dollars
available for further research into DBS.40 Another
example is neuroprosthetics, in particular those
implants that restore lost sensory abilities such as
cochlea and retinal implants or that enable neural
control over robotic prostheses.
The current focus of BCI research is on noninvasive BCIs that are small, transportable, and
low-cost. In particular, two approaches seem most
promising in this respect: Functional NearInfrared Spectroscopy (FNIRS), which measures
changes in brain tissue associated with neuronal
activity, and Electroencephalography (EEG),
which measures fluctuations of voltage on the
scalp. EEGs are more popular with researchers,
who have used them in a variety of ways. It has
already been demonstrated that equipped with an
EEG a paralyzed person can move a cursor on a
screen by simply imagining the movement
beforehand.41 For example, a monkey could
operate a robotic arm through a BCI to get food.42
There are many applications for this technology.
Major IT companies such as Google and Intel are
working on BCIs as new computer input devices,
making mouse and keyboard obsolete as early as
40
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2020.43 An Air University dissertation claims “[i]t
is likely that BCI technology will dominate
military systems in 2032.”44
A much more ambitious goal is to build a mind
reading device that can translate actual thoughts in
a manner that a computer can understand them.
For example, one could measure and catalogue
EEG responses to specific words and simply
match brain activity to thoughts. Such research is
indeed undertaken by scientists at the University
of California, Irvine. Researcher Mike D’Zmura
believes that it would take 15 to 20 years to
develop thought-based communication.45 Special
Operations Forces soldiers use the technology to
silently and efficiently communicate with each
other just by thinking (hence the project name
‘synthetic telepathy’). Neuroscientist Thomas
Naselaris opined that “[t]he potential to do
something like mind reading is going to be
available sooner rather than later…It’s going to be
possible in our lifetimes.”46 Although the Royal
Society report claims that “[t]here are very limited
prospects for a universal thought reading machine,”
because of the uniqueness of each brain and the
brain’s general plasticity (tendency to change over
time), the technology does at the very least raise
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some concerns about the prospect of new weapons
systems with direct neurological control.47
The potential advantage of BCI-controlled
weapons is that they could immerse soldiers better
in the battlespace when remotely controlling an
unmanned system for better situational awareness.
BCIs could also significantly improve threat
detection and identification accuracy, as well as
substantially reduce human response times.48 In
particular, DARPA is developing the ‘Cognitive
Technology Threat Warning System’ (CT2WS),
which uses an EEG that detects unconscious brain
responses to potential threats appearing on a
monitor and flags them to the operator. Via BCI,
soldiers will be better able to control complex
machinery such as robotic exoskeletons or
unmanned systems. This kind of research has
already stimulated a heated debate on the legality
of ‘neuroweapons’ based on using a soldier’s
brain processes as input for detecting a threat and
activating a weapon without requiring a conscious
decision on the part of the soldier whose brain has
been wired to the weapons.49
DEGRADATION TECHNOLOGIES
While enhancement seems to offer
exciting opportunities for gaining an advantage by
making soldiers smarter, they are also more
speculative. As a rule of thumb, enhancement
tends to be much more difficult than degradation.
However, enhancement is at the focus of the
academic literature since much of it is developed
more or less openly while degradation methods
such as more exotic nonlethal weaponry are often
portrayed as fictional or aspirational. FAS
researcher Steven Aftergood has mocked the
Pentagon over its excessive secrecy in this
respect, suggesting that it could allow little more
47
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than mumbo jumbo to prosper in the closed off
world of black projects.50
The reality of secret nonlethal weapons is
probably more complex. Regardless of what may
or may not exist at the present time, there is
clearly a potential for future neuroscience-based
nonlethal weapons that could be best described as
‘neuroweapons’ (sometimes referred to as ‘RF
weapons’, ‘psychotronic weapons’, or ‘influence
weapons’). Robert McCreight suggests the
following definition: “Neuroweapons are intended
to influence, direct, weaken, suppress, or
neutralize human thought, brainwave functions,
perception, interpretation, and behaviors to the
extent that the target of such weaponry is either
temporarily or permanently disabled, mentally
compromised, or unable to function normally.”51
These weapons generally target the human brain
and the central nervous system; they can impact
on mental and emotional states, mental capacity
and response times, and potentially higher
cognitive functions supporting thought,
perception, memory, and learning. These effects
could be achieved through a variety of means:
biochemical agents, directed energy weapons
(DEW), and even information/software (going
beyond normal PSYOPS).
Biochemical Agents
Most of the publicly available information about
offensive neuroweapons currently relates to the
potential use of biochemical agents as
incapacitants and potentially for otherwise
influencing the behavior of an adversary. While
chemical and biological warfare are
internationally outlawed, there are several legal
gaps that could allow the usage of biochemical
neuroweapons in specific contexts. A frequently
cited case is the use of the opioid fentanyl by the
FSB during the Moscow theater siege in October
50
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2002. The chemicals were intended to put the
Chechen terrorists to sleep, which also
accidentally killed 128 hostages (out of over eight
hundred) because of a delayed and wrong medical
emergency response.52
Nevertheless, researchers have made the claim
that biochemical calmatives and malodorants
could play an important role in future conflicts as
a nonlethal technique and could provide a
humanitarian alternative to the use of lethal
force.53 Militaries around the world have shown
interest in biochemical incapacitating agents for
counter-insurgency and counterterrorism
operations.54 Biochemical incapacitants could be
dispersed from the air or covertly introduced into
the water and food supply to assist in winning ‘the
hearts and minds’ and in neutralizing various
threats within a population. This is in principle a
very old idea that goes back at least to 1949 when
‘psychochemical warfare’ was proposed by Army
Chemical Center scientist L. Wilson Greene.55
There could be a range of new
neuropharmaceuticals under development that
could produce relatively predictable behavioral
effects and could prove suitable even for large
area psychochemical warfare attacks.
One biochemical agent that seems to have caught
the interest of the military is the neurohormone
oxytocin, which is naturally produced by the brain
and stimulates love or trust. Oxytocin could be
used for manipulating adversaries into
(temporarily) trusting us and thereby reduce the
52
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Biochemical Weapons (Plymouth, UK, Lexington
Books, 2007), pp. 35-66.
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occurrence of resistance.56 Oxytocin is
commercially marketed as ‘Liquid Trust’. The
U.S. military even investigated the possibility of a
‘gay bomb’, which was meant to distract enemy
forces by inducing sexual arousal and disrupt
morale.57 Even a ‘zombie bomb’ is imaginable:
the alkaloid drug scopolamine (also known by its
street name burundanga) can put people exposed
to it in a highly suggestible state, in which they
lose their free will.58 Bioethicist Jonathan Moreno
seems to be also concerned about future ‘brain
targeted bioweapons’ that could alter behavior.
Genetic bioweapons have been a concern for
some time, but a new nonlethal twist could be
added to them. Microbiologists have recently
discovered mind-controlling parasites that can
manipulate the behavior of their hosts according
to their needs by switching genes on or off.59
Since human behavior is at least partially
influenced by their genetics, nonlethal behavior
modifying genetic bioweapons that spread
through a highly contagious virus could thus be,
in principle, possible.
Directed Energy Weapons (DEWs)
DEWs are no longer the stuff of science fiction,
but have already been gradually transitioned to the
battlefield.60 They form a very broad class of
weaponry, which includes any type of weapon
that uses energy for producing a weapons effect,
most importantly lasers, high-powered
microwaves (non-nuclear EMP), high energy
radio-frequency weapons, and also sound or
acoustic weapons.
56
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Although much of DEW research is secret,
especially when it comes to antipersonnel DEWs,
there are a couple of weapons systems that have
been presented to the public and that are
operational. For example, it is documented that it
is possible to induce motion sickness, nausea,
disorientation, and seizures through stroboscopic
dazzling lights (‘Bucha effect’), or to produce
similar effects using certain acoustic or radio
frequencies.61 The Department of Defense (DoD)
has developed various laser dazzlers that
temporarily blind adversaries. Recently a
company has patented a new type of stun gun that
overstimulates the brain with bursts of lights and
thereby disorients people for up to 20 minutes.62
DoD has also developed acoustic weapons such as
the Long Range Acoustic Device (LRAD) that
can produce sounds that are still painful at
distance of a hundred meters.63 Another example
is the Active Denial System (ADS), which uses
microwaves of 95 GHz to create a burning
sensation on the skin over a distance of at least
300 meters and which can force hostile crowds to
disperse.64
Other antipersonnel DEWs are up to now more
hypothetical. A frequently cited declassified Army
document that summarizes some research into
biological effects of nonlethal weapons indicates
that microwaves could be used for transmitting
sounds directly into brains (the so-called ‘Freyeffect’) or for causing pain or death when the
brain is targeted due to the thermal effect of
microwaves.65 Jonathan Moreno also claims:
“Electromagnetic waves may be used to disrupt an
61
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enemy soldier’s nervous system, to cause epileptic
seizures, or to warm their body fluids as though
they were inside a microwave oven.”66 In the
1980s animal experiments with directed energy
weapons have shown promise in terms of
affecting mental states (changing EEGs) and
behavior.67 The possibility of radio frequency
(RF) weapons that target the brain has been
discussed more openly back in the 1980s.
References to them still appear in a few military
publications and declassified documents, which
suggests that research into this technology
continues.68 Analyst James Dunnigan claimed that
there “are radio transmitters that jam and shortcircuit the human nervous system. This
temporarily disables people the radio beams are
aimed at.”69
Microwaves could also be used for inducing
sensory hallucinations over distance. For example,
a ‘voice-of-good weapon’ that projects voices
directly into the heads of individuals in support of
PSYOPS could be possible and has been referred
to on a U.S. Army website.70 It has been reported
in the press that “previous research has shown that
low-frequency waves or beams can affect brain
cells, alter psychological states and make it
possible to transmit suggestions and commands
directly into someone’s thought processes. High
doses of microwaves can damage the functioning
66
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of internal organs, control behaviour or even drive
victims to suicide.”71 In the future it might be
possible to influence moods and mental capacity
of people in a larger geographic area using the
electromagnetic spectrum, and thus induce
passive, peaceful, riotous, or any other desirable
behavior.
Information/ Software Based Neuroweapons
Not all neuroweapons need to be of a physical
nature – some might just consist of information
that is designed to manipulate behavior or there
could be software that hacks neural devices or
implanted chips. DARPA has within its Biological
Technologies Office a neuroscience-based project
called Narrative Networks, which aims “to
understand how narratives influence human
cognition and behavior, and apply those findings
in international security contexts.”72 The context
for national security is to understand why certain
narratives are believed and others not and how
narratives can support terrorism. The methods
include research into how the brain responds to
certain narratives and the development of
computer models of how narratives affect
individuals and social networks.
A related effort is the Minerva Initiative, which
“seeks to build deeper understanding of the social,
cultural, and political dynamics that shape regions
of strategic interest around the world.”73 Another
project is the Sentient World Simulation, which
can simulate the behavior of entire societies and
thereby enable wargaming of PSYOPS.74 DARPA

71
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also funded research in the context of its Social
Media in Strategic Communications project,
exploring how emotions of users can be
manipulated through social media.75 Ultimately,
the various information/software initiatives focus
on social and behavioral research for
understanding “cultural and political
environments…where threats develop.”76 Such
research can potentially be used for the political
and psychological subversion of other societies or
for social engineering, which was a concern for
the older and similar Project Camelot.77
A further extension of PSYOPS is the use of
sophisticated battlefield illusions to directly
manipulate enemy perceptions. For example,
DARPA has made $4 million dollars available for
research into how the brain processes sensory
perception information so that perceptions can be
managed to “confuse, delay, inhibit, or misdirect
[the enemy’s] actions.”78 Around the world
defense establishments are also working on
invisibility cloaks and holograms that can make
an object disappear or to create a convincing
illusion of a non-existent object. Enemies might
be easily manipulated into surrendering if they
saw endless columns of holographically projected
soldiers marching towards them or divine
apparitions (a ‘Face-of-Allah’ weapon).79
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Military Information Support Operations already
intersect heavily with cyber security and cyber
operations because of the possibility of
conducting PSYOPS on and via the Internet. Once
neural devices are more commonly used as
computer input and brain stimulation devices
directly connected to computers, they could be
hacked just like any other piece of electronics, the
difference being that it is not just the normal
functioning of an external device that is at stake
but the functioning of a user’s brain. A hacker of a
neural device could alter brain waves, moods,
mental state and capacity of the user, and might
even take control of a user’s body through a BCI
to perform an unintended action.80 Such neural
hacking could even permanently ‘rewire’ the brain
of the user or ‘brainwash’ them.
Less technologically sophisticated methods of
‘mind hacking’ are imaginable. Malicious
software might attack the minds of users by
manipulating the flicker rate of the monitor and by
displaying subliminal messages on the screen that
cannot be consciously perceived.81 Although the
effectiveness of subliminal messages has been
often dismissed, neuroscientists have found
indications that subliminals do work in the sense
of somewhat affecting the behavior of people who
have been exposed to them – at least sometimes.82
It is uncontroversial that the advertising industry
has experimented with subliminals as described in
Vance Packard’s 1957 book The Hidden
Persuaders.83 Subliminal advertising has sparked
enough concerns to prohibit them in many
countries, including the United States. The
Russian government has even decided to
automatically scan media for subliminal messages
after it was reported in 2002 that a Russian TV
station included subliminals in their programming
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to manipulate their viewers to keep watching it.84
Research has shown that people can emotionally
respond to subliminal cues and that this can affect
attitudes and behaviors.85 The danger in
subliminals may not lie in directly causing action,
but in their capability of slowly shifting
perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs after an
extended period of exposure to them.
THE MIND AS A NEW DOMAIN OF
WARFARE
There is little doubt that neuro S/T has
numerous military and security applications, but
does this amount to any revolutionary change or
create a new domain of war? Is neurowarfare just
an evolution of existing methods of war and
technologies, or does it actually introduce a new
quality? Some may argue that psychological
warfare goes back to Ancient times and was
already advocated by military theorist Sun Tzu,
who counseled in The Art of War that “[t]o subdue
the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.”86
Neurowarfare might be just a refinement of
PSYOPS with some marginal improvements in
this area. However, modern PSYOPS still remains
limited to using communications for influencing
the “emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and
behavior” of a target audience,87 while
neurowarfare promises something different: direct
external control of human consciousness through
targeted manipulation of the brain. As Robert
McCreight has argued, “[t]houghts, beliefs,
perceptions, ideas, and behaviors could be made
directly vulnerable to external threat and control
for the first time in human history.”88 If it can be
achieved, states and other actors will aim to
dominate ‘neurospace’, bypassing conventional
military capability and other traditional defenses

of society, in order to gain a decisive advantage in
a conflict.
Neocortical Warfare
RAND analyst Richard Szafranski proposed in
1997 the term ‘neocortical warfare’ to describe a
new paradigm of war. Szafranski criticized the
Clausewitzian paradigm for being overly focused
on the need for violence as the main instrument of
coercion. Szafranski suggests “the intellectual
energy consumed by devising newer and better
ways to kill and destroy distracts us from the real
object of war: subduing hostile will. Lopping the
limbs off an enemy’s body, or even precisely
excising muscles from it, undoubtedly sends a
message to the enemy’s brain. Might there not be
other ways to communicate with hostile brains?”89
He goes on to further delineate neocortical
warfare from the older paradigm:
Neocortical warfare is warfare
that strives to control or shape the
behavior of enemy organisms, but
without destroying the organisms.
It does this by influencing, even
to the point of regulating, the
consciousness, perceptions and
will of the adversary’s leadership:
the enemy’s neocortical system.
In simple ways, neocortical
warfare attempts to penetrate
adversaries’ recurring and
simultaneous cycles of
‘observation, orientation, decision
and action.’ In complex ways, it
strives to present the adversary’s
leaders—its collective brain—
with perceptions, sensory and
cognitive data designed to result
in a narrow and controlled (or an
overwhelmingly large and
disorienting) range of calculations
and evaluations. The product of
these evaluations and calculations
are adversary choices that
correspond to our desired choices
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and the outcomes we desire.
Influencing leaders to not fight is
paramount.90
What Szafranski is calling neocortical warfare is
referred herein as neurowarfare: the manipulation
of enemy brains for the goal of subduing their will.
Similarly, Australian defense analysts Chloe
Diggins and Clint Arizmendi have argued that
neurowarfare is “about involuntarily penetrating,
shaping, and coercing the mind in the ultimate
realization of Clausewitz’s definition of war:
compelling an adversary to submit to one’s
will.”91 This goes clearly beyond PSYOPS and
can be aimed at degrading mental capacity,
altering mental states, altering emotions, and
potentially impacting higher cognitive functions
of perception, thinking, memory, and learning
(Fig. 1). Neurowarfare is also culturally agnostic
in the sense that people can be influenced at a
level of the brain, potentially bypassing cultural
factors and peculiarities.
The Human Domain
In recent years the U.S. military adopted the
concept ‘human domain’, which is added as a
sixth domain of war apart from land, sea, air,
outer space, and cyberspace. The human domain
comprises ‘human factors’ and the ‘human
terrain’. Human factors deal with aspects of
human nature and human capability that are
difficult to measure but that are critically
important in war and its conduct, namely, culture,
motivation, morale, emotions, training, leadership,
and so on. The ‘human terrain’ is “the human
population in the operational environment ... as
defined and characterized by sociocultural,
anthropologic and ethnographic data and other
non-geographical information.”92 The U.S. Army
continues to develop HTS by combining it better
with geographic information systems so that
everybody and all activities can be tracked and
referenced to a geographic location for better
situational awareness in the human domain.
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A 2012 DoD white paper on ‘Strategic
Landpower’ declared the central importance of the
human domain to all warfare and argued “[w]hat
we know and project about the future operating
environment tells us that the significance of the
‘human domain’ in future conflict is growing, not
diminished.”93 The paper emphasizes the
continued importance of landpower and the
growing importance of conflicts short of war,
where lethal power may not be the most effective
way to meet U.S. strategic goals. It clearly hints at
possibly covert methods of influencing other
societies so that actual warfare becomes
unnecessary.
A subsection of the human domain that could
emerge in the future could be called ‘neurospace’:
the technical interface at which brains and minds
interact with their environment. Chloe Diggins
and Clint Arizmendi have argued that neural
interfaces such as neural devices and BCIs could
become ubiquitous and that they could therefore
become targets of cyber attacks:
“The possibilities for damage,
destruction, and chaos are very
real. This could include
manipulating a soldier’s BCI
during conflict so that s/he were
forced to pull the gun trigger on
friendlies, install malicious code
in his own secure computer
system, call in inaccurate
coordinates for an air strike, or
divulge state secrets to the enemy
seemingly voluntarily.”94
In light of the rapid advances in neuro S/T it no
longer seems far-fetched that militaries will seek
to dominate neurospace by hacking the human
brain and by devising new technologies that
harden own personnel against neurowarfare
attacks. In many respects neurowarfare would be
fairly similar to cyber warfare with the exception
that attacks are not directed against technical
systems and networks, but against biological
cognitive systems, which may occur through some
neuro-cyber interface or BCI and which would
aim to steer consciousness. Some researchers have
93
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even suggested the creation of an ‘Internet for
minds,’ thereby creating a ‘noosphere’ that could
one day form a super-intelligent hive mind.95
Combat in neurospace would become a struggle
over the formation and direction of collective
consciousness. What follows in the final section is
brief discussion of key strategic problems related
to neurowarfare.
Approaches to Neurowarfare
In principle, neurowarfare can be waged
defensively and offensively. In a defensive
function neurowarfare may be used to suppress
conflicts before they can break out. A potentially
hostile society may be calmed and hostile
attitudes or perceptions adjusted accordingly. For
example, defense analyst Henrik Friman has
pointed out, perceptions of winning and losing are
central to all forms of warfare. So if one could
somehow manipulate enemy leaders into
believing that they have won, they would
terminate hostilities before they have actually
gained the advantage they originally sought or
they may never see the need for resistance in the
first place.96 In an operational environment, where
“[t]he most compelling future defense-relevant
shocks are likely to be unconventional,” the
importance of managing perceptions of potentially
hostile populations grows.97
Occupied populations could be more easily
pacified and incipient insurgencies could be more
easily suppressed before they gain any traction.
Calmatives could be put into the drinking water or
populations could be sprayed with oxytocin to
make them more trusting. Potential terrorists may
be detected using brain scans and then chemically
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or otherwise neutered.98 This obviously creates the
possibility of creating a system of high-tech
repression, where in the words of writer Aldous
Huxley “a method of control [could be
established] by which a people can be made to
enjoy a state of affairs by which any decent
standard they ought not to enjoy.”99
Offensive neurowarfare would be aimed at
manipulating the political and social situation in
another state. It could alter social values, culture,
popular beliefs, and collective behaviors or
change political directions, for example, by way
of regime change through ‘democratizing’ other
societies – a complaint that is frequently heard
from Russia.100 A Special Operations Command
White Paper claims “Russia, China, and Iran
currently conduct political warfare activities to
further their individual goals” and suggests a
“strategy enabling the U.S. to influence local
struggles in a positive direction” should be
developed.101 However, offensive neurowarfare
could also mean collapsing adversarial states by
creating conditions of lawlessness, insurrection,
and revolution, for example, by inducing fear,
confusion, or anger. Adversarial states could be
destabilized using advanced techniques of
subversion, sabotage, environmental modification,
and ‘gray’ terrorism, followed by a direct military
attack.102 As a result, the adversarial state would
not have the capacity to resist the policies of a
covert aggressor. Neurowarfare could take down a
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strategic competitor permanently without nuclear
war and the risk of devastating nuclear retaliation.
Targeting
Like cyber warfare bypasses the battlefield,
neurowarfare bypasses the state altogether and
might target individual civilians (political leaders),
societal subgroups, or entire societies. As a result,
the traditional distinction between combatants and
noncombatants may become meaningless. There
is already a legal debate over the question whether
and under what conditions civilians can be
targeted with nonlethal weapons, for example, in
the context of counterterrorism and
counterinsurgency operations.103 This debate is
bound to intensify once neuroweapons mature.
A further complication with respect to
noncombatant targeting arises from the tendency
that neuroweapons may be employed covertly
without the target of the attack ever being aware
of the attack.104 A neurowarfare attack may not
even cause any physical harm to a person
subjected to it and may in this respect be akin to
targeting civilians with propaganda, however,
with more drastic and immediate effects. Enemy
leaders could be targeted to degrade their ability
to make sound decisions or to steer their decisions
into a particular direction. Individuals may be
driven insane and manipulated into random acts of
violence. Societal subgroups may be manipulated
into rising against their government, and whole
societies may be thrown into political turmoil and
chaos.
While such methods of war seem intuitively
objectionable from an ethical point of view, they
increasingly represent the current reality of
‘hybrid warfare’, ‘political warfare’, and other
forms of societal destabilization that are being
employed with great effectiveness by several
major nations.105 There is currently no legal
protection against mind manipulation, although
103

John W. Lango, “Nonlethal Weapons,
Noncombatant Immunity, and Combatant
Nonimmunity: A Just War Theory,” Philosophia 38
(2010): 475-497.
104
McCreight, “Brain Brinkmanship,” p. 117.
105
U.S. Special Operations Command, CounterUnconventional Warfare, p. 3.

18

one can argue that covert mental coercion would
violate human dignity and by extension human
rights.106
Deterrence
How can we deter neurowarfare attacks?
Deterrence can be defined as “the use of threats to
dissuade an adversary from initiating an
undesirable act.”107 Its success depends on two
factors: the threat needs to be clearly
communicated to the adversary and secondly, the
threat needs to be credible. The credibility of the
threat again depends on two factors, namely, the
capability of the coercer to carry out the threat and
the likelihood that the threat will actually be
carried out when the undesirable act occurs.
‘Neurodeterrence’ can have two meanings: 1)
deterrence based on insights gained from neuro
S/T and 2) deterrence with neuroweapons or
against neurowarfare. In the first meaning,
neurodeterrence is clearly possible: neuroscience
can gain great insights into foreign cultures and
how S/T affects brain functions and decision
making as pointed out by the NRC study.108 In this
sense, neuroscience can help understand the true
motivations of an opponent in order to find a
punitive strategy that would most strongly
influence an adversary’s behavior.109 Secondly,
nations will want to deter the use of neurowarfare
against them, or they might use neuroweapons for
deterrence more generally as part of their defense
posture.
Currently, there are some key problems with
deterring a possible neurowarfare attack by an
adversarial state. A threat may be communicated
in secret using diplomatic channels saying that if
neuroweapons are used by the adversarial state it
will produce a certain unfavorable response. The
106
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problem is that unless the public is made aware
that an invisible or indirect attack with
neuroweapons against a state’s leader or
population has occurred, it will not support any
open punitive action against the aggressor. The
response would therefore have to be limited to
some covert action, possibly a response in kind,
attacking the minds of the adversary’s leaders and
population, which risks escalation. Furthermore,
secret weapons would unlikely deter an aggressor
for the simple reason that capabilities have to be
demonstrated in order to make a threat credible.
Secret military capabilities have little deterrence
value.
Unfortunately, there are few incentives for any
nation that succeed in developing neuroweapons
to openly declare that they have them and might
use them. Such a declaration would be
counterproductive for several reasons: the
declaration might spark a neuroscience arms race
as more powers would seek these capabilities, the
advantage of surprise would be lost, and other
states may find effective countermeasures. Not
surprisingly, many states have kept their research
into potentially revolutionary nonlethal weapons
secret from the public for decades.110 The result
may be that governments adopt by default an
opaque posture with respect to their neurowarfare
capabilities, which could potentially result in a
failure of deterrence and subsequent disaster.
Some nations may be able to use a perceived
capacity for developing neuroweapons as leverage
in international relations, getting concessions from
much more powerful states.111
Threshold to War
There is a common problem with respect to all
nonlethal approaches to warfare, be it cyber
warfare, economic warfare, financial warfare, or
ideological subversion, and that is the question
under what circumstances the threshold to war has
been crossed and when a kinetic response to the
nonlethal attack could be justified. Neurowarfare
directed against enemy leaders, enemy forces, and
an enemy’s society could be conducted in
peacetime or outside a declared armed conflict.
Just like cyber warfare, neurowarfare is inherently
110
111
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difficult to define and regulate since both methods
of war could be generally conducted covertly, are
difficult to attribute, and often cause no visible
effect or damage. Up to now cyber war has only
been able to produce a limited degree of societal
disruption by making targeted web services
temporarily unavailable and by causing financial
damage.
However, cyber warfare is still seen as being
potentially able to bring a nation to its knees
through sophisticated attacks against critical
infrastructure such as the electricity grid, mass
transportation systems, and stock markets. For this
reason an emergency conference-call system that
includes all key cyber war decision-makers has
been set up for the event of a major cyber attack
on the nation, including a dedicated emergency
communications line from Washington to
Moscow.112 The authority for engaging in
offensive cyber operations outside of an armed
conflict rests with the President, which again
indicates that cyber warfare activities are indeed
considered ‘war’ and not merely an extension of
espionage that does not require such
authorization.113 The rationale for these
restrictions for offensive cyber operations is based
on the risk of unwanted escalation and the risk of
unintended large-scale collateral damage, which
would also apply to neurowarfare and other
methods of subversion.
Currently, arms control agreements do not cover
neuroweapons, as the technology could fall in
between the CTC and BWC.114 The use of
neuroweapons might be treated similarly to cyber
warfare activities and could be correspondingly
restricted, both domestically and internationally.
A ‘no first use’ doctrine might make sense with
respect to offensive neurowarfare. Governments
112
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and other organizations also would be welladvised to think about effective ‘neuro-defenses’
that can protect leaders, personnel, and society at
large from sophisticated attacks on their minds,
including their perception, emotions, and
consciousness. Unfortunately, the great secrecy
surrounding neuroweapons can be detrimental, as
it could lead to underestimating a very real and
growing threat. So one can ask the question,
“Should we risk waiting until the tangible first
evidence of neuroweapons research has landed on
the front page of our major newspapers and CNN
[before we start thinking about the threat]?”115
Governments need to make it clear under what
conditions they would use neuroweapons and how
a neuroweapons attack by a foreign power would
be answered. In short, a neurowarfare doctrine is
needed and should be developed before
neurowarfare becomes a reality and a tangible
threat.
CONCLUSION
Neuroscience research will have a substantial
impact on warfare and security in numerous ways,
ranging from the enhancement of personnel, the
improvement of strategic intelligence, new
screening devices that can detect hostile intentions
or guilty knowledge, thought-controlled weapons,
and offensive neuroweapons that can directly
influence mental capability, perception, emotions,
and thoughts of people. The sum total of the
military applications of neuro S/T can be called
neurowarfare, and it may become a distinctive
domain of warfare in its own right. Ultimately,
there is no higher valuation in war than subversion
of the enemy’s mind. If this can be achieved
through targeting the enemy’s brain directly, it
would be the most powerful weapon that has ever
been devised by humanity. Considering the
dangers of neuroweapons and the prospect of
governments and terrorist groups secretly
wielding neuroweapons against individuals,
groups, or society in pursuit of strategic goals
within a decade or so, it is time to think seriously
about how to protect leaders, government
personnel, and society at large – and about how
neurowarfare can be governed.
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Figure 1 (Source: Author).
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Brazil Space: Military Dependency and the Case of the Geostationary
Satellite of Defense and Strategic Communications
Gills Vilar Lopes
In Brazil, there has been no transition model of space capabilities promoted by the military sphere
(especially the Brazilian Air Force) for nurturing the civil one (Brazilian Space Agency). Drawing upon
official documents and legislation as primary sources, the case study of the Geostationary Satellite of
Defense and Strategic Communications (SGDC) is analyzed in light of the space strategic sector. Main
factors that impede the PEB are related to military-technological dependence and poor resource
management, with draconian budget cuts and projects canceled before having achieved realistic
milestones.
the Brazilian Air Force (FAB) – continued to play
Brazil is the largest economic power in
a central role in Brazil’s space activities.
South America and has one of the world’s best
places to launch rockets, the Alcântara Launching
With the Brazilian Space Agency’s (AEB’s)
Center (CLA).1 But when it comes to space
creation in 1994, it was also expected that PEB
operations via own satellites, it is Argentina that
civil programs would gradually become more
2
leads in the subcontinent. Why, then, does the
autonomous, and expertise in space accumulated
Brazilian Space Program (PEB) not take off? 3
during the military regime would transfer to the
Answering that question is the main goal of this
Agency. In practice, however, PEB languished in
article.
a comprehensively dependent relationship – in
Many believed that, after Brazilian military rule
technological, operational, and human resource
(1964-1985) and the end of the Cold War, the
terms – with respect to FAB. The Brazilian logic
PEB would be demilitarized, as had happened
of refusing to ween and strengthen their civil
with other important programs and organs of the
space activities goes against the current world
regime such as the Brazilian secret service.
trend: main counterexamples are the National
However, over the years, the military – especially
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA),
the European Space Agency (ESA), and
Argentina’s National Commission for Space
1
Gills Vilar Lopes is finishing his Ph.D. at the Federal
Research (CONAE) here in South America.
University of Pernambuco (UFPE), Brazil. He
currently serves as a Pró-Estratégia research fellow
(CAPES & Presidency of the Republic’s Secretariat of
Strategic Affairs, Brazil). Earlier versions of this article
– in Portuguese and English – were published in the
Brazilian Army’s Meira Mattos Collection: Military
Science Review, available at
http://www.eceme.ensino.eb.br/meiramattos/index.php/
RMM/article/view/505. The author thanks journalist
Kaiser David Konrad for his interview.
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SpaceFlight, 21 September 2015,
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(accessed 22 September 2015).
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Formally and legally, the PEB is called National
Program of Space Activities (PNAE). See: Brazil,
National Program of Space Activities (PNAE)
(Brasília: Ministry of Science, Technology and
Inovation, 2012), 9.

Furthermore, an oft-made assertion, both by the
National Policy for Development of Space
Activities (PNDAE) and the PEB itself, is of the
need to synchronously array and connect private,
academic, and governmental sectors in order to
attain space excellence. But, as this article shows,
that is the theory, or, in legal terms, only the
programmatic norm. The reality is that one of the
major problems hindering the development of
Brazilian space activities is precisely the fact that
state policy to boost important variables such as
domestic industry for this sector practically does
not exist. Despite some tax exemptions, which are
directed to the very few private Brazilian
companies operating in the space sector, the
current political and economic crisis facing the
country can bring devastating consequences for
PEB.
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This work examines the claim that even after the
end of both the Cold War and military rule, as
well as a broadening of the security concept in
Brazil, there is still no transition model of space
capabilities from the military sphere (FAB) to the
civil one (AEB).4 While the PEB, officially, is
supposed to synthesize public policy (civil and
military), there is no professional esprit de corps
that can underwrite the development of
independent civil space activities.
To corroborate such a thesis, a history of the
AEB’s public documents demonstrates strong
military dependence for development of Brazil’s
space activities, with a crucial nexus being
creation of the strategic space industry – by the
Ministry of Defense. This paper also analyzes the
case of Brazil’s first geostationary satellite. Once
live, the satellite will produce vital information for
both the civil and military fields, providing on the
one hand, Internet access for all Brazilian territory,
and the other, safer ways to exchange strategic
and meteorological information.5 But for all that
to happen, the Geostationary Satellite of Defense
and Strategic Communications (SGDC) must
arrive in space. That is where the AEB comes in.
With respect to the Brazilian military sector, it is
worth emphasizing that important documents of
the Brazilian Ministry of Defense (MD) – the
National Defense Policy (PND), National Defense
Strategy (END), and Defense White Paper
(LBDN) – rank the space sector as a strategic
sector for national development. As to the civil
field, Brazilian legal documents spell out the role
of space activities for development. This paper,
then, illuminates the dialog between civilians and
the military and how this relation shaped and
ultimately hindered the Brazilian space program.
Despite the international context of Brazil space
and the lingering likelihood of using force in the
4
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international environment, guiding documents of
Brazilian defense and space policies lack, at many
junctures, a sufficiently Hobbesian view of
international relations.6 A strong hint of liberal
institutionalist aspirations lies in the fact that the
two main END (National Defense Strategy)
promoters were the former Minister of Defense
Nelson Jobim (a non-military politician who was
congressman, minister of justice, and minister of
the Brazilian Supreme Court) and the then
Minister of the Presidency of the Republic’s
Secretariat of Strategic Affairs (SAE) Mangabeira
Unger (a professor of Law at Harvard University).
Indeed, PEB’s directive explicitly encourages a
space culture in Brazil, and END asserts that
national defense must not be military-restricted
subject matter.7
THE BRAZILIAN SPACE PROGRAM (PEB)
& AGENCY (AEB)
In order to analyze the Brazilian space
program’s (PEB’s) strengths and weaknesses,
today, it is essential to understand how the
Brazilian Space Agency (AEB) was created and
the distribution of space competences with other
agencies and institutions, mostly military. Eyeing
previous professional schools of the Brazilian
Navy and Army (1910s), as well as the Brazilian
Air Force’s school for Military Aviation (1941),
the PEB has its beginnings in the mid-1950s, with
the creation of the Aeronautics Institute of
Technology (ITA) and the Aeronautics and Space
Institute (IAE), both belonging to Aeronautics
Command’s (COMAER’s) Aerospace Science
and Technology Department (DCTA).8 Still, it
6
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was only with NASA-FAB cooperation in the
early 1960s that Brazil began to explore space in
earnest.9 Under military rule in Brazil, the PEB
received the ambitious challenge of mastering the
full access-to-space cycle through the Brazilian
Complete Space Mission (MECB) although the
initiative was subsequently abandoned without
reaching its main goal.10
Returning to democracy in the late-1980s and
1990s, Brazil tried to deconstruct the whole
repressive apparatus erected by military rule.
Accordingly, Fernando Collor de Mello’s first
presidential act was extinguishing the main
repressive organ of the old regime, the National
Information Service (SNI). And his successor,
Itamar Franco, tried to give civilian airs to the
militarized PEB.
According to the Brazilian Constitution (1988), it
is solely for the Union to legislate over
Aerial/Space Law11. On 10 February 1994, using
this legal premise, President Itamar Franco
created the AEB, which succeeded the Brazilian
Commission for Spatial Activities (COBAE),
which in turn had been linked to the Armed
Forces General Staff (EMFA).12 Unlike its
predecessor, AEB sat as a federal, civil, and
independent body.13 Originally reporting directly
to the Presidency of the Republic, within less than
a decade, that institutional bond was transferred to
the Ministry of Science, Technology and
Innovation (MCTI), which was formed to oversee,
Ivanil E. Barbosa, Carta aberta do SindCT ao Ministro
Aldo Rebelo (São José dos Campos: SindCT, 4
September 2015),
http://www.sindct.org.br/files/Carta%20Aberta%20Ald
o%20Rebelo.pdf (accessed 22 September 2015), 1.
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among other things, national space policy.14
As a comparison, Argentina’s space activities
followed a quite similar path: Argentina’s
National Commission for Space Research
(CONAE) was also created in the early 1960s and
incorporated into the armed forces, and at the
beginning of the 1990s was recreated as a civilian
body.15 The difference was that CONAE received
growing financial and political investments during
the 2000s16.
Like Argentinian CONAE, Brazil’s space agency
has the overall task of promoting development of
space activities in the national interest.17 Despite
having its head office and forum located in
Brasilia’s Federal District, AEB is better known
for using the world famous Alcântara Launching
Center (CLA), which is tied to the COMAER
(Aeronautics Command) in the state of Maranhão,
in Brazil’s Northeast Region.18 This base’s
overarching function is to ensure satellitelaunching vehicles (SLVs) can be safely sent to
space.
The Agency’s most important project in the SLV
area is the Projeto VLS-1, which conveys the
strategic import of producing a national vehicle of
such kind – though for pacific ends.19 Figuring as
one of FAB’s leading projects, it nevertheless
aims to strengthen the national aerospace defense

14

Brazil, “Law nº 8.854/1994.” Brazil, “Decree nº
4.718/2003.” Brazil, “Decre nº 5.886/2006” (Brasília:
Presidency, 6 September 2006).
15
Daniel Blinder, “Argentina Space: Ready for
Launch,” Space & Defense, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Spring
2015), 34-46.
16
Blinder, “Argentina Space,” 36.
17
Brazil, “Law nº 8.854/1994”; Brazil, “Decree nº
4.718/2003.”
18
Brasil, “Decree nº 4.718/2003.”
19
The technicians that died in the CLA accident in
2003 were working exactly at this project. For more
details: “Acidente em Alcântara começou com
incêndio, diz Comandante”, Folha Online, 23 August
2013,
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/ciencia/ult306u990
6.shtml (accessed 22 September 2015). Brazil, PNAE,
11.

25

Space & Defense

industry.20 Through VLS-1, the civil and military
spheres coalesce more and more towards a single
purpose: make a satellite and successfully place it
in geostationary orbit, so it can provide across
Brazil’s regions broadband Internet access and
secure military communications.21 Even so, due to
sizeable budget cuts in the PEB during 2015,
VLS-1 runs the risk of being paralyzed.
It is worth noting that AEB is the central body in
the National System of Space Activities
Development (SINDAE)22, being a coordinator of
it and its titular leader.23 This system exists to
allow military and private institutions to
participate actively in the development of
Brazilian space activities. SINDAE comprises
three formal classes of organs: central, sectoral,
and participant.24 Concerning the composition of
that second class – responsible for sector
coordination and execution of actions contained in
the PEB – a strong demand for greater dialogue
between the civil and military spheres can be
perceived in national legislation, the military
sphere being represented by DCTA (Aerospace
S&T Department under the Brazilian Air Force).
Figure 1 presents SINDAE’s composition, by
which it can be observed that both launching
centers – at Alcântara and Barreira do Inferno –
and the IAE are organs attached to the Air Force
20

Luiz Guilherme Sá da Silva, “Indústria de defesa
aeroespacial e os projetos da Força Aérea Brasileira”,
Revista ADESG, Vol. 267, No. 2 (2012): 4-5.
21
Brazil, Estratégia Nacional de Ciência, Tecnologia e
Inovação (ENCTI): 2012-2015 (Brasília: MCTI, 2012),
16.
22
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interest. See: Adilson da S. Lemos Junior, Implantação
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96/D1953.htm (accessed 22 Setember 2015); Brazil,
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24
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Command’s DCTA.
There are examples showing how SINDAE
components relate to each other. Although the
space and defense industries are suffering with
high budget cuts, one of the Brazilian projects
with potential for commercial use is the
Microsatellite Launch Vehicle (VLM) project, as
a result of the successful partnership between IAE
and the German Aerospace Center (DLR).25
Currently VLM seeks, in the national aerospace
industry, companies able to manufacture the
rocket to put it on the international market and
increase the pace of production. As part of the
Academy, the AEB sponsors some programs to
encourage relevant space research, including
scholarships and guided tours.26
As shown in Figure 1, AEB is SINDAE’s central
organ, and because of that it has in its basic
structure a Superior Council, which is the
deliberative organ responsible for approving the
entry of participants in the system.27 The relation
between civil and military spheres is nominally
strengthened here. However, despite the fact that
SINDAE’s central organ is an independent civil
agency, the system’s functioning depends on
partnership with the military. In this vein, of
nineteen representatives who are below the
President of AEB on the Advisory Board, only
two come from Universities and Industry, and five
are related to the military sector. The Ministry of
Defense (MD), the former Presidency of the
Republic’s Institutional Security Cabinet (GSI) –
now called Casa Militar – and the commands of
Navy, Army and Air Force are also present in
SINDAE.28
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The law responsible for AEB’s creation also
foresaw the updating of the 1994 National Policy
for Development of Space Activities (PNDAE).29
PNDAE incentivizes public-private partnership,
including closer exchanges with the military. As
proof, primary directives of PNDAE are rather
interesting: three of them address capacity training
for strategic technology of dual usage – they
emphasize employment of space technology in the
solution of problems like security and defense of
national territory.30 Also, by accentuating that
space activities must necessarily promote national
development, PNDAE reinforces ambitions laid
out in documents representing high political
consensus – the National Defense Policy (PND)
and the National Defense Strategy (END).31
PNDAE establishes the following
conceptualizations that are indispensable to
understanding development of PEB:
space systems: devices meant either to
operate in space or to permit space operating of
equipment that will grant access to information or
services;
space infrastructure: installations,
systems or surface equipment, plus associated
systems that provide necessary support to
effective operations and usage of space systems;
space activities: systematic efforts to
develop and operate space systems, as well as
related infrastructure, to grant mankind expansion
of knowledge about the universe; especially planet
Earth and its atmosphere; and exploring, for
employable ends, the availability of these new
devices32 [Emphasis in original, our translation].
Figure 2 shows how concepts elaborated by
PNDAE recognize AEB’s role in supporting the
military space strategic sector. Putting concepts
in Figure 2 to work, the Geostationary Satellite of
Defense and Strategic Communications (SGDC)
can be defined as a space system of both military
29

Brazil, “Decree nº 1.332/1994” (Brasília: Presidency:
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30
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(defense) and civil (communications) uses, to be
launched in Earth orbit (geostationary) by a space
infrastructure – specifically an SLV launchingcenter – in order to develop space activities of
strategic value to the Brazilian state and society.
By promoting the development of space systems
and ground infrastructure, PNDAE endeavors to
implement Brazilian space activities like SGDC
that can only be put into practice via a national
space program such as PEB, a long-term approach
with projects spanning nearly a decade (20122021).33 In order to support ambitions of PEB,
Brazil invested an average of R$ 385 million
(about U$ 96 million) per year in space activities
thru 2012.34 Planned investment over the next ten
years is approximately R$ 900 million (about
US$ 225 million) per year, an increase of nearly
250 percent.35 The SGDC alone is anticipated to
cost R$ 716 million (about US$ 179 million)36.
In 2012, the fourth version of PEB was
prematurely cast due to the fact that its authors
understood the federal government at the time
provided salient opportunities to rethink the space
program.37 Among these opportunities was the
SGDC project. Of course, PEB reality is quite
different from that provided by laws and official
documents. PEB maintains very strong
dependence on the military sector to pay for major
projects in space. PEB still suffers from poor
33
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in Brazil, the Real-Dollar parity reached in September
2015 the highest rate in its history (1: 4). Because of
this unpredictable variation, it is reported the original
amount in Reais (R$). Brazil, PNAE, 16.
35
Brazil, PNAE, 17.
36
Brazil’s Federal Senate, Em Discussão, Year 3, No.
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management and heavy budget cuts.38 Regarding
the lack of civilian technicians and bureaucrats
dedicated to the space program, consider that the
first AEB-sponsored public competition only
occurred in late-2014, i.e., a full twenty years after
its creation.39
One could hope that the more military space
projects were boosted, the more AEB and PEB
would also be boosted. But the Brazilian armed
forces have their own Strategic Space Systems
Program (PESE), of which AEB is not a part.40
While implementation of the so-called space
strategic sector engendered by PND and END has
indeed helped PEB and AEB, it also increased the
civil agency’s dependency on the military sector,
as the next section seeks to demonstrate.
THE (MILITARY) SPACE STRATEGIC
SECTOR: FAIR WINDS FOR THE
BRAZILIAN (CIVIL) SPACE PROGRAM?
National Defense was never a pulsating
theme in Brazilian political discussions because,
as the saying goes, “Defense does not generate
vote” (“Defesa não dá voto”). In 2005, the first
National Defense Policy (PND) was published,
followed in 2008 by the first National Defense
Strategy (END) in Brazil’s history. It was the first
time the Brazilian state – not only its government
– thought in a formal, public, and strategic way
about defense in the medium and long term.
The 2012 versions of PND and END designated
three sectors as “strategic” to the national defense
and development of Brazil: nuclear, cyber, and
space.41 These three interlinked strategic sectors,
38

For an idea of AEB's annual budget, view the
expected and settled values per year in:
http://www.aeb.gov.br/programaespacial/investimentos. Check also a criticism of this
subject in: Barbosa, Carta aberta.
39
AEB, “Concurso AEB”, 2014,
http://www.aeb.gov.br/concurso-aeb (accessed 12
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40
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Brazil, PND e END, 93-7; Gills Lopes, “A
emergência do tema ciberguerra: contextualizando a
criação do Centro de Defesa Cibernética à luz da
Estratégia Nacional de Defesa.” In: Concurso de
Artigos sobre o Livro Branco de Defesa Nacional

moreover, transcend the partition between civil
and military boundaries.42 When the strategy
documents combine nuclear, cyber, and space
sectors, then “visualizing the country itself not
[any longer] depending on foreign technology is
possible – and having the three forces working in
synthesis, coordinated through monitoring that is
done, too, from space” [emphasis added, our
translation].43
Another example of synergy between strategic
objectives and different actors is the making of the
Geostationary Satellite of Defense and Strategic
Communications (SGDC). Besides this project,
Brazilian airspace control entails dialogue
between space and cyberspace, especially for the
modernization of the Air Defense Operations
Center (CODA) and for aircraft upgrades to the
new Communication, Navigation and
Surveillance/Air Traffic Management (CNS/ATM)
control system and satellite navigation.44
Although these tasks have special significance for
the Brazilian Air Force (FAB), END sets specific
goals and milestones for each service in the
Armed Forces.
For example, the Brazilian Army must modernize
its brigade modules, which requires a broad
spectrum of technological means, from the least
sophisticated to the most advanced means of
communication between land operations and
space monitoring.45 This is the first indicator that
the SGDC will serve not only purposes of the
FAB, but the other armed forces, too, reinforcing
interdependency of the strategic sectors. The
Brazilian Ministry of Defense, through END,
establishes four strategic goals and three strategic
directives to FAB. For space as a strategic sector,
the first objective and the third directive are
relevant, respectively, prioritizing aerial
(Brasília: Ministry of Defense, 2011),
http://www.defesa.gov.br/projetosweb/livrobranco/arqu
ivos/apresentacao-trabalhos/artigo-gills-lopes.pdf
(accessed 22 September 2015).
42
Brazil, PND e END, 49; Carlos Newton, “Três
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Revista ADESG, Vol. 273, No. 2 (December 2012), 6-7.
43
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surveillance and integrating space activities in
FAB operations.46
With respect to the first strategic goal, END
counts space as a domain – like its marine,
terrestrial, and aerial predecessors – so Brazil, in
order to surveil its national territory and
jurisdictional waters, will have to rely on its own
platforms and systems for monitoring.47 Among
other projects, here is where the SGDC enters the
picture; in the absence of a one hundred percent
national geostationary satellite, it is nearly
impossible to exert effective surveillance.
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remains a crucial factor in international relations,
sharply altering the calculus for national defense
and security.52 With this presumption, developing
SLVs can cause a spillover effect in other policy
areas as well as branches of the armed forces. This,
indeed, makes the Brazilian Army’s case; the
Army is already developing the missile and rocket
system ASTROS 2020, costing R$ 1.1 billion
(about U$ 277 million).53

Besides satellites, END anticipates other kinds of
monitoring technologies such as satellite
launching vehicles (SLVs) and intelligence
aircraft.48 These strategic tools form a “monitoring
complex” by layers, called the Brazilian
Aerospace Defense System (SISDABRA),
administered under the Brazilian Aerospace
Command (COMDABRA), with the mission of
assuring sovereignty over Brazil’s national
airspace.49 The development and refinement of
SISDABRA will mark Brazil’s bid for national
autonomy, specifically as it relates to foreign
systems such as the U.S. Global Positioning
System (GPS).50 Once operative, the SGDC
should be a key element in SISDABRA.

Now, since PND and END assign implementation
of the strategic space sector to FAB, nothing is
more logical than having information and
technology sharing among sectors. But in
proposing three strategic sectors (nuclear, cyber,
and space) for both defense and national
development, the Ministry of Defense assigned
each of the three armed services responsibilities
for boosting them.54 There are historical and
logistical reasons behind this distribution of
competencies. For example, the Brazilian Navy
has been developing the nuclear-powered
submarine project since 1979.55 So nothing is
more reasonable than having the nuclear strategic
sector borne by the Navy while the space strategic
sector goes to the FAB’s stewardship. Residually,
then, the cyber strategic sector was awarded to the
Brazilian Army, which in any case already
possessed expertise with electronic warfare.

As to its third strategic directive, END states that
FAB’s organic functions ineluctably depend on
monitoring via space. In this sense, development
of national SLVs shall serve as a broad instrument,
not only to support foreign space programs but to
develop national technology for the design and
manufacturing of missiles.51

Figure 3 presents this distribution of roles and
missions, identifying the three strategic sectors
according to END. In implementing the national
defense strategy, however, there were two major
surprises, namely, the economic crisis and the
relative lack of civil or business interest in the
space area.56

In geopolitical terms, the Ministry of Defense
accepts that the possession of long-range missiles
– derived from the use of rockets, for example –
46
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With regard to the political and economic crisis, it
can be said that its harbinger occurred in late 2014
– an election year in Brazil – with serious
budgetary consequences in mid-2015. This caused
many investment losses and subsequent
cancellation of governmental programs and
projects, including strategic ones.
For example, budget cuts in the Defense Ministry
were 25%.57 Specifically in regard to PEB, the
most important sign of the economic crisis
appeared in July 2015, when the Federal
Administration waivered a ten-year agreement
with Ukraine, extinguishing thereby the binational
company Alcântara Cyclone Space (ACS), which
was intended “to launch satellites aboard
Ukrainian Cyclone-4 rockets from Brazil’s
Alcântara spaceport...”58 It is noteworthy that the
Brazilian-Ukraine partnership had already
consumed R$ 1 billion (about U$ 250 million).59
Besides its own organizational budget cuts, PEB
had to adjust to space strategic sector cuts because,
as seen, the interrelationship is very close.
However, among space strategic sector priority
projects – SLVs; satellites; satellite-based
communications, command and control
technologies; and satellite-driven geographic
information systems – if there is one that should
not be canceled amid the crisis, it is precisely the
SGDC. This is justified by reasons analyzed in the
following section.60
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CASE STUDY: THE MAKING OF THE
GEOSTATIONARY SATELLITE OF
DEFENSE AND STRATEGIC
COMMUNICATIONS (SGDC)
This case study of the making of Brazil’s
first geostationary satellite has two main
objectives, namely: i) to demonstrate the need for
a fully national satellite for Brazilian strategic
communications; and ii) to support the main
hypothesis that there is no functioning transition
model of space capabilities from the military to
civil sphere in Brazil.
Brazil decided to manufacture the Geostationary
Satellite of Defense and Strategic
Communications (SGDC) in 2011 in order to
address the national security demand for strategic
– civil and military – communications.61 As its
name foretells, it is a geostationary satellite, that
is to say, its operating orbit – navigating above
Earth’s equator – is almost 36,000 km.62 This kind
of satellite contrasts with the so-called low earth
orbit ones on altitudes between 500km and
800km.63
According to France and Sellers, a general rule for
this type of satellite is that geostationary
constellations employ three or more satellites with
ground infrastructure and cross-linking to
accomplish global coverage.64 This is not the case
for SGDC as it is only one satellite that can map a
portion of the globe (across the longitudinal range
of Brazil) without the process of triangulating.
This ends up being one of the SGDC’s best
advantages: provision of independent strategic
and civil communications for Brazil without the
cost of a full constellation borne by other space
powers.
In light of PEB, the SGDC was a structuring and
mobilizing project the implementation of which
was on schedule until the last day of 2014 when it
61
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was postponed to 31 December 2016.65 In 2012,
all forty geostationary satellites operating in
Brazil were actually foreign. Brazilian enterprises
were limited to supplying ground equipment and
antennas for control stations serving television,
telephony, tracking, and broadband Internet, as
well as military activities and image generation.66
The independent creation of a satellite with
strategic attributes – combined with the custom
that international technological cooperation is
usually not marked by bountiful sharing of
valuable information – would benefit Brazil,
granting it autonomy in monitoring its sovereign
territory.67
Though the Brazilian Space Agency (AEB)
foresees the possibility of international
cooperation, it is only plausible by means of
working through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and taking into account MCTI (Ministry of
Science, Technology & Innovation).68 For
example, one of the main AEB initiatives for
international cooperation was the BrazilianUkranian enterprise ACS, demonstrating that
international cooperation is – or was until July
2015 – vital to the development of PEB, with or
without SGDC.69
As to management, the SGDC project deals with
two organs: the steering committee and the
executive group. The former is led by Brazil’s
Ministry of Communications (MC) and includes
the Ministry of Defense (MD) as well as MCTI.70
The executive group is comprised of the following
65
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entities: Telebras, MD, MC, AEB, and the
National Institute for Space Research (INPE).71
Telebras, beyond presiding over the executive
group, is also responsible for running, jointly with
MD, the SGDC operation after its launch while
AEB – specifically its Satellite Directorate,
Applications and Development – will retain
intellectual property rights on the satellite’s
technology transfer.72
For SGDC’s manufacturing per se, a new
enterprise called Visiona Tecnologia Espacial
emerged in 2012 from the cooperation between
Telebras and Embraer Defense and Security.73
Once again, the civil-military component is
highlighted here in order to demonstrate how
Brazilian space aspirations are indeed dependent
upon high profile projects connected to the
military and national defense.
As shown in Figure 4, the public/government
sector – represented by Telebras – oversees
arrangements with private enterprise to implement
SGDC’s manufacturing. The present idea is that
Brazil’s Defense Industrial Base (BID) will be
stimulated and rewarded in the production of
defense products (PRODE).74 Indeed, it is a
71
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necessary action, considering that according to the
Brazilian Senate, “since Embratel’s privatization,
satellite services used by the Armed Forces are
supplied by private enterprises”.75 Visiona’s
creation directly addresses three of PEB’s
strategic lines of action, namely, commit industry
at all stages of space project development;
encourage the creation of integrator enterprises;
and stimulate critical technologies.76 Nevertheless,
the joint venture, Visiona, is being widely
criticized – especially by the Brazilian Union of
Federal Civil Servants in Aerospace Sector
Science and Technology (SindCT) – in the sense
that it “is acting only as an intermediary in the
acquisition, entirely abroad, of SGDC, throwing
out of its development not only INPE, but the
whole domestic industry which serves PEB.”77
Unlike most Brazilian space programs, the SGDC
project might yet survive threats of cancelation
and reach its goals. However, negotiations for
acquisition of both components and satellite
launch are in train with foreign powers: FrancoItalian Alenia Space (TAS) and the French
enterprise Arianespace.78 If the SGDC project was
designed, among other purposes, to strengthen the
incipient Brazilian space industry, in practice it is
doing the opposite: strengthening foreign defense
companies by providing stimulative contracts at
the expense of national enterprises central to the
transport means, uniforms, and materials of individual
or collective usage for activities intended for defense,
with a caveat for those of administrative usage”
(Brazil, “Decree nº 7.769/2012”).
75
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2013, http://www.embraer.com.br/enus/imprensaeventos/pressreleases/noticias/pages/satelite-geoestacionario-vaigarantir-a-seguranca-das-comunicacoesbrasileiras.aspx (accessed 22 September 2015).

future autonomy of Brazil.79
CONCLUSION
Brazil is part of a select group of nations
in possession of a strategic space program, but
there are several factors that limit this program
short of a viable strategic space capability, which
comprises satellite operations, manufacture, and
launch.80 Among the obstacles, this article
highlighted the following: strong technological
and logistical dependence in relation to the
military sector and consequent deficiencies in
human capital, particularly among Brazilian Space
Agency (AEB) personnel; PEB mismanagement
of resources, especially those dedicated by law to
development of the national space industry;
premature project cancellations before an
endeavor can reach useful milestones; and
substantial recurring budget cuts. Added to this
are deficiencies in regional cooperation – even
interest – for pooling resources to advance space
programs during times of economic crisis in South
America.81
After the demise of the ACS agreement with
Ukraine, Brazil should consider a medium-term
strategic partnership with any country at a more
advanced stage in the space strategic sector. One
possible candidate is Argentina, which, while
facing political and economic crises for years,
nevertheless shepherds a more organized space
program than Brazil’s and already operates its
79

Isso se torna ainda mais notório ao analisar o recémpublicado Edital de Seleção Pública encabeçado pelo
MCTI e pela AEB, que prevê a contratação de
empresas brasileiras para apoiar projetos referentes à
transferência das tecnologias previstas no Acordo de
Transferência de Tecnologia Espacial firmado entre a
AEB e a TAS. Cf.: “Edital de Seleção Pública
MCTI/AEB/FINEP/FNDCT – Subvenção Econômica à
Inovação – Transferência de Tecnologia do SGDC –
01/2015” (Brasília: FINEP, 15 September 2015).
80
Lopes Filho, Nas asas da história, 24.
81
To get an idea of this lack of South American
interest, just remember that the UNASUR considered
the creation of a regional space agency, but the project
was not even drafted. See:
http://www.infoespacial.com/latam/2011/11/13/noticialos-ministros-de-defensa-de-unasur-plantean-crearuna-agencia-espacial-conjunta.html.
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own geostationary satellite.
Major powers are working behind the scenes to
fill the vacuum left by Ukraine. For example,
Russia has been angling to launch its new Angará
rocket from the Alcântara Launch Center (CLA).
Similarly, China wants to expand its ongoing
partnership with Brazil through the China-Brazil
Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS), in order to
build a binational partnership for its Longa
Marcha family of launchers. Despite good
intentions toward PEB as well as the desire to
launch satellites from Brazil, a regulatory
agreement on technological cooperation with the
United States remains to be signed so that
satellites with U.S. components may be launched
from Brazilian soil; without agreement, there is no
hope of a commercial joint project in the space
sector.
Now, with the Brazilian Complete Space Mission
(MECB) abandoned, it is expected that the SLV-1
Project is on a slower development path than
SGDC. In the midst of the current economic crisis,
the German-Brazilian Microsatellite Launch
Vehicle (VLM) can be considered the design with
the greatest commercial potential. Aspirations of
stimulating a Defense Industrial Base (IDB), and
specifically a robust space industry, conflict with
economic demands now facing the country. But
this financial reality is not exactly new, as “It is
easy to see that the Brazilian government does not
have available funds for years when compared
with other major centers of space programs.”82
Given the current crisis and lack of public
investment, academic-university partnerships
present an excellent opportunity, not only to
reduce research and development (R&D) costs but
to create a space culture among future Brazilian
scientists and produce homegrown technology. Of
course, this is not a solution to the PEB barriers,
but it is a medium-to-long-term alternative that
Brazil needs to seriously consider.
As seen, two major initiatives of PEB concerned
(i) launching satellites from national soil and (ii)
aligning the National Policy for Development of
Space Activities (PNDAE) with broader priorities
82

Lemos Junior, Implantação, 23 (our translation).
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of the national budget. Only after these
accomplishments can it be said that there is
genuine geopolitical and strategic enthusiasm for
augmenting Brazilian autonomy through space
exploration.83 Building Brazil’s first geostationary
satellite (SGDC) coheres with this sympathetic
interpretation of PEB and also with the National
Defense Policy (PND) and the National Defense
Strategy’s (END’s) convergence on the Brazilian
space strategic sector. Ironically, reducing space
dependency on Brazil’s own military programs, as
well as foreign corporate champions, can go a
long way toward supporting Brazil’s national
autonomy through independent strategic
monitoring and communications.
As SINDAE’s central organ, AEB endeavors,
through space activities, to integrate and
coordinate civil and military interests. In practice,
authentic coordination is hampered by AEB’s near
total dependence on the military. SGDC
exemplifies Brazil’s imbalanced civil-military
relations when it comes to the strategic space
sector – crucial for national development as well
as national defense. The space program is codified
in official documents under both priorities of the
Brazilian government, but SGDC, like other large
projects in technological and budgetary terms, is
spearheaded by a defense company.84 In addition,
AEB presides over Brazil’s space complex by
contracting with foreign companies for acquisition
and, more ominously, for the very launch of
SGDC.
Space is indispensable for Brazil; it “is, and will
continue to be, a critical environment for both
civilian and military operations.”85 In Brazil’s
case, however, the strategic space sector is out of
balance. Given the current state of affairs, the
perplexing underperformance of Brazil space is
likely to continue beyond the economic crisis, that
is, until lawmakers can address the politicalinstitutional causes of its arrested development.
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Figure 1 – SINDAE’s composition
Source: http://www.aeb.gov.br/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/manual_identidade.jpg (with adaption).

Figure 2 – Arch concepts held by PNDAE
Source: Vilar Lopes, “To Infinity and Beyond”, 183.1
Legend: SLV = satellite-launching vehicle.
1

Gills Vilar Lopes, “To Infinity and Beyond! AEB and the Case of Geostationary Satellite in Light of the Space
Strategic Sector,” Coleção Meira Mattos – Revista das Ciências Militares, Rio de Janeiro, Vol. 9, No. 34 (Jan./Apr.
2015): 177-88.
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Figure 3 – Strategic Sector (END)
Source: Vilar Lopes, “To Infinity and Beyond,” 181 (with adaptation).2
Legend: BID = Defense Industrial Base; AF =Armed Forces.

2

Gills Vilar Lopes, “To infinity and beyond,” 177-88.
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Figure 4 – Project and attribution structure on the SGDC Program
Source: Brazil, ENCTI, 206.
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APPENDIX A - Acronyms and Abbreviations
Acronym/abbreviation Meaning (in English)

Translation (if applied)

Nature

Associação Brasileira das
Indústrias de Materiais de
Defesa e Segurança

civil

Abimde

Brazilian Association of
Defense and Security
Industries Materials

ACS

Alcântara Cyclone Space

AEB

Brazilian Space Agency

Agência Espacial
Brasileira

Civil

BID

Defense Industrial Base

Base Industrial de Defesa

military

CBERS

China-Brazil Earth
Resources Satellite

Satélite Sino-Brasileiro de
Recursos Terrestres

Civil

CLA

Alcântara Launching
Center

Centro de Lançamento de
Alcântara

military

CNS/ATM

Communication,
Navigation and
Surveillance/Air Traffic
Management

Cobae

Brazilian Commission for
Spatial Activities

Comissão Brasileira de
Atividades Espaciais

military

CODA

Air Defense Operations
Center

Centro de Operações de
Defesa Aeroespacial

military

COMAER

Aeronautics Command

Comando da Aeronáutica

military

COMDABRA

Brazilian Aerospace
Command

Comando de Defesa
Aeroespacial Brasileiro

military

CONAE

National Commission for
Space Research

Comisión Nacional de
Actividades Espaciales
(Argentina)

Civil

DCTA

Aerospace Science and
Technology Department

Departamento de Ciência
e Tecnologia Aeroespacial

military

DLR

German Aerospace Center

Deutsches Zentrum für
Luft- und Raumfahrt

Civil

EMFA

Major-State of Armed
Forces

Estado-Maior das Forças
Armadas

military

END

National Defense Strategy

Estratégia Nacional de
Defesa

military

ESA

European Space Agency

FAB

Brazilian Air Force

GPS

Global Positioning System

civil

military

civil
Força Aérea Brasileira

military
civil
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Presidency of the
Republic’s Institutional
Security Cabinet

Gabinete de Segurança
Institucional da
Presidência da República

IAE

Aeronautics and Space
Institute

Instituto de Aeronáutica e
Espaço

military

INPE

National Institute for
Space Research

Instituto Nacional de
Pesquisas Espaciais

civil

ITA

Aeronautics Institute of
Technology

Instituto Tecnológico de
Aeronáutica

military

LBDN

Defense White Paper

Livro Branco da Defesa
Nacional

military

MC

Ministry of
Communications

Ministério das
Comunicações

civil

MCTI

Ministry of Science,
Technology and
Innovation

Ministério da Ciência,
Tecnologia e Inovação

civil

MD

Ministry of Defense

Ministério da Defesa

military

MECB

Complete Brazilian Space
Mission

Missão Espacial Completa
Brasileira

military

NASA

National Aeronautics and
Space Administration

PEB

Brazilian Space Program

Programa Espacial
Brasileiro

civil

PESE

Strategic Space Systems
Program

Programa Estratégico de
Sistemas Espaciais

military

PNAE

National Program of Space
Activities

Programa Nacional de
Atividades Espaciais

civil

PND

National Defense Policy

Política Nacional de
Defesa

military

PNDAE

National Policy for
Development of Space
Activities

Política Nacional de
Desenvolvimento das
Atividades Espaciais

civil

SAE

Secretariat of Strategic
Affairs of the Presidency
of the Republic

Secretaria de Assuntos
Estratégicos da
Presidência da República

civil

S&D

search and development

SGDC

Geostationary Satellite of
Defense and Strategic
Communications

GSI

civilmilitary

civil

civilmilitary
Satélite Geoestacionário
de Defesa e Comunicações
Estratégicas

civilmilitary
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SINDAE

National System of Space
Activities Development

Sistema Nacional de
Desenvolvimento das
Atividades Espaciais
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civilmilitary

SindCT

Union of Federal Civil
Servants in Aerospace
Sector Science and
Technology

Sindicato Nacional dos
Servidores Públicos
Federais na Área de
Ciência e Tecnologia do
Setor Aeroespacial

civil

SISDABRA

Brazilian Aerospace
Defense System

Sistema de Defesa
Aeroespacial Brasileiro

military

SLV

satellite-launching vehicle

SNI

National Information
Service

TAS

Thales Alenia Space

Telebras

Brazilian
Telecommunications S.A.

Telecomunicações
Brasileiras S.A.

Civil

VLM

Microsatellite Launch
Vehicle

Veículo Lançador de
Microssatélite

civilmilitary

civilmilitary
Serviço Nacional de
Informações

military
civil
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Meeting Growth Challenges of Mexico Aerospace:
The Querétaro Cluster
Mónica Casalet
Growing the Aerospace sector in Mexico requires multilevel agreement between original equipment
manufacturers (OEMs), including foreign companies, and national and sub-national governments to
stimulate programs and instruments for sector growth. In addition, space for local learning must be
cultivated within a process of production organized hierarchically and highly regulated on the
international level. The case of the Queretaro cluster is important due to the density of networks created,
extensive public-private collaboration, and the emergence of specialized institutions to train and shape
highly skilled (professionals and technicians) in the aerospace industry. Ultimately, there remains an
important vacuum to fill in the future, in particular, integration of Mexican small and medium-size
enterprises (SMEs) in the international value chain of the sector.

High technology in the design and
manufacture of products within the aerospace
industry (AI), combined with international
certification, encourages centralized management
and close business-government relationships for
companies looking to compete in the global
economy.1 Domestic concentration of the industry
is very high; in every subsector there are but few
competitors. Aeronautics and astronautics demand
heavy investment up front and are characterized
by exceptionally long production cycles.
Financing product development is a critical factor
for companies’ success, which affects not only
small suppliers but also the big contractors,
although the latter have more possibilities to share
risks and costs.
From the beginning, AI has been considered
strategic by national governments, especially with
frequent and close interdependence between the
industry’s civil and defense markets, where state
support and market protection have functioned as
instruments for organization and financing.
Widespread national efforts to maintain
technological development and the role of high
salaries for attracting specialized human capital
lead to globalization of the sector: new emerging
countries line up to make an incursion as
manufacturers or as assemblers along the AI value
1

Mónica Casalet is a member of the Facultad
Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales – FLACSO,
México.

chain. Evolution of the global aerospace industry
has become a kind of microcosm for
understanding the national politics behind
strategic international development. In emerging
markets as well as industrialized countries, the
aerospace sector is supported by government
strategies, which have nurtured strong commercial
support (on quality, price, and service) to sustain
this industry.
Expanding attention towards emerging markets
for both aerospace products and services
represents a growth opportunity for the sector
globally as well as emerging countries. New
national players in the sector have become
conversant in specialized production processes
involving multidisciplinary discoveries; an
accelerated innovation process facilitated by novel
management methods; and multisector spillover
applications available in general platforms.2
Advanced manufacturing within industrialized
countries contributed to a global paradigm for AI
in the organization of production and institutional
structure. This triggered multiple political
strategies oriented towards the development of
R+D programs and reinforcing approval of public
funds to stimulate research—in close
collaboration with productive sectors—all while
increasing industrial competitiveness.

2

Roco, M., W. S. Bainbridge, and B. Whitesides,
“Convergence of Knowledge, Technology and
Society,” Science Policy Reports, 2013.
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Among other things, aerospace research drove
applications of new models with a high
percentage of composite materials for fuel
efficiency and lower maintenance costs, and
engine innovation to diminish noise, fuel
consumption, and carbon emissions. At the same
time, institutional structure became dynamic with
new modes of professional and technical training
to guarantee the acquisition of better skilled labor,
which raised qualifications across a broad range
of workers and managers, as well as tapped into
professional experience from retired professional
personnel in developed countries with an
aerospace tradition.
Construction of complex multilevel networks
intertwined domestic technology in emerging
regions like Latin America with the global
production chain. As these networks continue to
expand and deepen, emerging countries are
playing an increasingly important economic role
because of the opportunities they offer AI with
respect to established companies, at home and
abroad, as well as a growing number of small,
highly innovative enterprises.3
DEVELOPMENT OF THE AEROSPACE
SECTOR IN MEXICO
In various policy studies completed by
public and private institutions within Mexico such
as the “road maps,” which arose to orient growth
of the sector, the name, aerospace industry, was
adopted even prior to growth of Mexico’s
aerospace production or sales.4 The single label
3

In much of Latin America PME stands for pequeña y
mediana empresa (small and medium enterprise); as in
the United States, it represents a business sector with
high potential for job growth and innovation,
contingent upon effective public policies.
4
The map for the technological route of AI in Mexico,
was elaborated by a group of public and private
organizations—ProMéxico, Consejo Nacional de
Ciencia y Técnologia (Conacyt) (National Council for
Science and Technology), Secretaria de Economia (SE)
(Ministry of Economy), Dirección General de Aviación
Civil (DGAC) (General Direction of Aviation),
Federación Mexicana de la Industria Aeroespacial
(FEMIA) (Mexican Federation of the Aerospace
Industry), Consejo Mexicano de Educación
Aeroespacial (COMEA) (Mexican Council of
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for the sector conceals differences in growth and
consolidation among industries, including how
close each has approached international
technological standards and concentration of sales
around a single product or platform. The structure
of knowledge networks, for example, prevailing in
the aeronautics versus space sub-sectors is quite
distinct, the space industry being linked more with
knowledge based on science while aeronautics
tends toward knowledge in engineering and new
materials.5 In spite of these differences, the rapid
growth of the aeronautical industry in Mexico
contributed to sophistication of the demand for
commercial space products and services, boosting
the growth and institutionalization of the space
sector.6 The goal of this essay is to identify the
advantages that AI clusters operating at the
sectoral and regional level generate for Mexico’s
development.
In 2003, the Ministry of Economy decided to
invest in the development of the aerospace sector
in Mexico, launching a strategy to attract
international companies and to facilitate their
location in Mexican regions with productive and
entrepreneurial maturity. The National Program
for Trailblazing Companies boosted by
ProMexico sought in conjunction with the
Ministry’s outreach to develop productive clusters
Aerospace Education) and Fundación Mexico-Estados
Unidos para la Ciencia (FUMEC) (U.S.-Mexico
Foundation for Science). Casalet, Mónica, "Chapter IIIActores Y Redes Públicas Y Privadas En El Desarrollo
Del Sector Aeroespacial Internacional Y Nacional: el
Clúster De Querétaro, Una Oportunidad Regional
(Public and Private Actors and Networks in the
Development of the National and International
Aerospace Sector: the Queretaro Cluster)." La
Industria Aeroespacial. Complejidad Productiva E
Institucional (The Aerospace Industry. Productive and
Institutional Complexity) (D.F., Mexico: FLACSO and
Conacyt, April 2013), p. 105.
5
Broekel, Tom, and Ron Boschma, “Aviation, Space
or Aerospace? Exploring the Knowledge Networks of
Two Industries in the Netherlands,” European
Planning Studies Vol. 19, No. 7 (December 2010):
1205-1227.
6
In 2010 the Agencia Espacial Mexicana (AEM)
(Mexican Space Agency) was created to guide the
formation and research of the sector, and orient the
formation of public-private consortiums.
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of aerospace firms specifically at the state level
within (federal) Mexico and linked to the world
market. The arrival of investments from Canada,
France, and Spain created opportunities for
Mexican businesses to raise revenue and ascend
the sector production chain, stimulating the
income of Mexican companies. The installation in
the country of world class companies such as
Honeywell, Bombardier, Grupo Safran, EADS,
and ITP complemented aerospace sector
development policies of the national and state
governments; this was especially true with respect
to industrial groupings in central and northern
regions. The modern Mexico Aerospace sector is
now formed by companies dedicated to
manufacturing, maintenance, engineering repair,
design, and auxiliary services.7 In the most recent
data by ProMexico (2013), the sector registered a
growth of 17.2% per year since 2004. Nowadays
there are 287 companies. 28% are big companies;
43% correspond to medium-sized companies; and
29% to small and micro-businesses.
Although there is interest from companies in
acquiring certification (according to international
standards such as the 9100 Series), which is
necessary to access the global chain of production,
not all companies have this seal for quality
management of systems in the aerospace sector.
The AS9100 standard includes addendums for
approval and handling of suppliers. The
NADCAP norms managed by the Performance
Review Institute (PRI) control special processes
and products, besides promoting continuous
improvement in industries like automobiles and
aerospace. Not all Mexican companies with
possibilities of participating in the chain of
production have the conditions or interest, or find
a viable niche in the aerospace sector, even if they
have acquired manufacturing experience in the
automobile industry.
Entry into the Aerospace sector requires favorable
technical and production conditions for
reconversion, and certification demands expenses
up front for local companies to be part of the
chain of suppliers, which presents an important
7

Secretaría de Economía (Ministry of Economy),
Sector Aeroespacial Mexicano (Mexican Aerospace
Sector), 2011.

income barrier. At the same time, Mexico
subscribed to international agreements such as the
Bilateral Air Security Agreement (BASA) and
Wassenaar Arrangement in order to guarantee
certification, confirm security of processes, and
reduce expenses of local companies in the
certification of products and labor.8
The hope was that participation in these club-like
groups would attract new investments, open
access to the latest technology, and increase
exports. National and entrepreneurial agencies
estimated the number of jobs generated at more
than 31,000 professionals. The level of Mexico’s
exports in 2012 rose to 5.04 billion USD, with
76% of production exported to the United States.
According to data from the U.S. Department of
Commerce, in 2009 Mexico supplied products for
the Aerospace sector in the value of 604 million
USD, marking 127% growth compared to 2006.9
Secondary destinations for exports mapped to
Germany and France, then Canada and the United
8

The accepted worldwide standard for the aerospace
industry is the 9100 Series. Its application is decisive
for entering the supply chain of parts and components.
The 9100 Series is a model for quality management
systems in the Aerospace sector based on the standard
ISO 9001:2000 guideline. Its implementation is under
the International Aerospace Quality Group (IAQG),
which is under the Society of Automotive Engineers
(SAE). This guideline emphasizes quality, security, and
technology in all stages of the supply chain and is
applied in all aspects both military and civilian. SEDGIPAT, 2012 (Economy Ministry – Heavy Industry
and High Technology General Directorate).
In the case of the Aerospace sector, NADCAP
(National Aerospace & Defense Contractors
Accreditation Program) certification is required by the
main manufacturers of motors and planes for the entire
network of suppliers. Obtaining NADCAP certification
exempts the company from other audits by
manufacturers that recognize it (SE-DGIPAT, 2012).
In 2012 Mexico joined the Wassenaar Arrangement
(WA). This has two fundamental implications. One is
that Mexico adheres to the non-proliferation of
conventional arms; the other is it joins the club of high
technology countries, which allows it access to new
markets and technology. WA membership improves
competitiveness and attracts investment from different
sectors.
8
SE, 2011. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of
the Census, 2009.
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Kingdom. Meanwhile, imports for the same year
were a healthy 4.36 billion USD. In 2012,
investment in the sector rose to 1.3 billion USD,
totaling more than 4 billion USD over the last four
years.10
Of the strategic pillars of development for the
Mexican Aerospace sector, the northeast region
(Baja California, Sonora, Chihuahua) stands out:
It includes more than half of the national industry
specialized in electric-electronic systems and
boasts a regional niche in avionics. Meanwhile the
central-northern region (Mexico City, Queretaro,
and Nuevo Leon) specializes in the assembly of
value-added components, located near the main
airports of the country, as well as repairs and
maintenance of aircraft.11 More detailed
information on aerospace clusters forming in
Mexico after the government’s economic policy
initiatives of 2003 is displayed in Table I, below.
MEXICO AEROSPACE: TOWARD A NEW
MODEL OF GOVERNANCE BASED ON
INTER-INSTITUTIONAL
COLLABORATION
In the creation of productive aerospace
clusters across different industrialized countries, a
distinct geographic space draws companies,
suppliers, research centers, and professional and
technical training institutes, together with support
undertaken by national and sub-national
governments. Intermediary organizations link the
various elements of an aerospace cluster, building
a mutual field of influence, the strength of which
depends upon the density of established links
connecting production, research, and training of
specialized labor. In Mexico’s case, despite a
decade of policy efforts to develop the Aerospace
sector, the public-private framework is still
incipient. Strong microeconomic differences place
barriers to learning among companies; some do
not have the minimum competitive thresholds to
9

Secretaría de Economía (Ministry of Economy),
Industria Aeronáutica en México (Aeronautical
Industry in Mexico), 2012.
10
FEMIA, Secretaría de Economía (Ministry of
Economy), Pro-Aéreo 2012-2020 Programa
Estratégico de la Industria Aeroespacial (Strategic
Program of the Aerospace Industry), 2012, pp. 99.
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take advantage of positive externalities cultivated
by government. Again, from the mid-2000s,
public institutions, entrepreneurial partnerships,
and state governments promoted technology
development and constructive competition,
looking to combine relationships of cooperative
partnership and market incentives to support the
Aerospace sector. In this context, the needs of
state and local companies are served when they
acquire new knowledge and become part of a
high-technology system of production;
international companies meanwhile seek new
investment opportunities with lower costs of
production and competent labor, not to mention
the incentive of having the American market close
by.
The line of action of public policies since 2003
has been oriented towards mobilizing new
instruments created and executed by the
‘Secretaria de Economía’ (SE) (Ministry of
Economy); Conacyt; NAFIN; and Pro Mexico.
Meanwhile, international organizations such as
BID (Inter-American Development Bank); the
OCDE (Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development); and PNUD (UN Development
Program) promoted upgrades in production
standards, supported decentralization and
competition among financial sources for creation
of aerospace clusters, and stimulated training of
specialized engineers in the sector.
The foresight, at both public and private levels, to
plan the growth of a sector, rather than a single
firm anointed as aerospace champion for Mexico,
was remarkable, perhaps unprecedented in the
country’s development strategy. Apart from
sparking collaboration on framing challenges and
determining priorities for the regions among
public and private actors, universities, and public
research centers, a new, dynamic market for
intermediary organizations was created.12 On the
state and sectoral levels this new breed of firm
thrived in the interstices between traditional
companies, supplying communication channels
and negotiating structures to new-style members
of the aerospace network-cluster: universities,
12

Examples include business chambers such as
FEMIA, CANIETI, and other linking institutions such
as FUMEC.
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technology centers, and government officials. In
linking the scientific community with the public
and private sectors, they performed relationshipbuilding functions that substituted and in some
cases surpassed the old efforts of government
offices for knowledge transfer.
Table II (below) flows from the Mexican
government’s strategic decision to construct a
structure of governance at the Aerospace sector
level that would nurture fundamental networks of
collaboration, research, training, and investment.
Subsequent public policies mobilized private
sector investment across several dimensions
(connectivity, collaboration for training and
research, financial resources, specialization of
small and medium enterprises in supplier
development programs) to sustain creation of
productive groupings within the sector.
Governmental attention shifted toward collective
strategies of intervention that could exploit certain
advantages for sector growth: improved standards
for competition, targets for critical mass within a
cluster, increased R&D to consolidate investment
on regional priorities, and preferential tariffs for
importing and exporting of goods. Assembly
thereby encouraged in Mexico included aircraft,
components, machinery, and equipment. The
structure of incentives also influenced the location
of OEMs and foreign direct investment (industrial
parks, improved airport runways to receive heavy
airplanes, a loading and passenger terminal, an
interior customs house, and the fiscal precinct).
Application of these incentives was sustained by
public resources and the contribution of large
international integrating companies anchoring the
clusters. “Brick and mortar” articulation of sector
infrastructure indirectly affected mainstream
operations. New paradigms of knowledge,
advanced manufacturing, and diffusion of
information technologies revealed the next rung of
novel challenges in processes of production and in
cognitive abilities for workers as well as
managers: these are non-trivial problems to
resolve in order to expand complex production
environments with multidisciplinary platforms.
In general, macro-, meso- and micro-complexity
will increase in a fractal pattern so that barriers to

production do not get easier as one scales down to
subcontractors or even divisions within firms. The
need for appropriate state intervention to develop
synergies and organize priorities around a vision
of educational, relational, and productive growth
has been greater than it first appeared from a
macro perspective. An example of this complexity
would be the sectoral change contingent on
transformations in the management of universities
to adapt to challenges of knowledge transfer, such
as incentivizing progress of research groups
toward commercialization of new technology in
the Aerospace sector once there is an integrated
overall vision linking ICT policies with industrial,
educational, and research activity.
AN AEROSPACE CLUSTER WITH HIGHDENSITY INSTITUTIONAL NETWORKS
In the state of Queretaro, which has
experienced robust industrial growth, traditional
sectors like the manufacture of parts and metal
components coexist with sectors that have greater
technological intensity like automobile and
electronics manufacturing, specialized chemicals,
and food biotechnology.13

13

The state of Queretaro, located in the center of the
country, has a total population of 1,827,937, of which
70% reside in urban areas; in 2012-13 it had an
education average of 9.2, above the national average of
8.9, and a low rate of illiteracy (5.5%) compared to the
national total (6.1%), according to figures from the
Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (INEGI)
(National Institute of Statistics and Geography). The
value of Queretaro’s exports reached an amount of 7.4
billion USD, which represented 2.3% of national GDP;
the manufacturing industry stood out as the main
activity, and the subsector with the most participation
was manufacturing of transport equipment, which
represented 54% of manufactured exports (Ministry of
Economy, 2012). See also, Daniel Villavicencio, Juana
Hernández, and Leonardo Souza, "Capacidades y
oportunidades para el desarrollo de la industria
aeronáutica en Querétaro- (Capacities and
opportunities for development of the aeronautical
industry in Queretaro), in Casalet M, La Industria
Aeroespacial. Complejidad Productiva e Institucional
(The Aerospace Industry. Productive and Institutional
Complexity) (DF, Mexico: FLACSO and Conacyt,
April 2013), pp. 49-92.
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The Queretaro State Development Plan, as well as
its S&T program established the Aerospace sector
as a priority for state development together with
the automobile sector. Both sectors received
government support through productivity and
financial incentives. The prior establishment and
high performance record of the Mexican
automobile industry provided a solid foundation
for development of the Aerospace sector, for it
trained engineers and accelerated the pace of
industrial production.14
Queretaro concentrates production on products
and machining processes of complex components,
manufacturing of aero-structures, manufacturing
of components for engines, manufacturing of
brake systems, MRO (maintenance, repair and
overhaul) for propulsion engines, manufacturing
of landing gear and MRO, and technical treatment
and manufacturing of components for complex
materials.
In order to stimulate high-tech entrepreneurship,
the State of Queretaro set aside the Fund for
Competitiveness of SMEs (Ministry of
Sustainable Development, 2009); sponsored
programs previously mentioned, including ISO
9000 certification, that fostered development of
small and medium enterprises; and granted
specialized consulting and coaching for business.
To maintain the ISO 9000 standards, for example,
Queretaro state government still covers 33% of
the financial cost; the federal administration
contributes another 33%; and the rest is paid by
the company that wishes to obtain certification
(Council of Science and Technology of the State
of Queretaro, 2010).
Relationships with educational institutions are
another pillar for consolidation of the aerospace
cluster in Queretaro, for those understandings
result in a reliable and less expensive supply of
qualified labor (technicians, engineers, IT
personnel), essential for foreign investors,
especially companies that initially demanded
coaching or training of Mexico’s technicians
outside the country. Diversity is manifest in the
14

This was included among the top ten best producers
in the world, putting together 2,261,000 vehicles from
January to December 2010.
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integration of local companies into development
programs of global suppliers. Most local
companies first enter AI at a competitive
disadvantage in terms of investment capital,
infrastructure, and a critical mass of skilled labor
to attend the demands of this high-tech market;
these deficits present formidable obstacles to
fulfilling production deadlines according to
international demand and to the new entrants’
long-term survival.
Thickening of innovation networks manifests in
frequent collaboration between universities,
public research centers (PRCs), and companies of
the Aerospace sector, which gradually strengthens
bonds of trust – building social capital and
facilitating acquisition and transfer of new
knowledge (Table III, below). The use of diverse
channels for knowledge transfer presents
peculiarities and, again, added complexity.
Among the most significant challenges are the
sheer number of component parts and the
technology level of tools for design and assembly.
Intriguingly, financial consulting; worker training;
information technology; and commercialization
support – all with integration of local suppliers –
plus linkages of research groups and experienced
international partners in exchanges with industry,
these opportunities have evolved in some cases
from informal relationships based on academic
interest of researchers to formal agreements that
resolve incentives for long-term, institutionalized
transactions.15
Market entry of Mexican systems and subsystems
supply for transnational AI companies has
occurred, and these phenomena are tied to
dynamic global value chains on an international
scale. Where the geographic proximity of the
American market plays a determining role,
transport and time costs are reduced; benefits
provided by NAFTA and innumerable incentives
offered by state and national governments for
sector growth also have an impact.
Engineering and manufacturing companies that
make up the aerospace cluster in Queretaro
actively participate and receive counseling in state
15

Casalet, 2013, p. 94.
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programs. They also maintain good
communication with local research centers (e.g.,
Ciateq, Cidesi, Cideteq and especially with
UNAQ), and most of them have asked for support
from national innovation programs within
Conacyt (National S&T Council).
The development structure for suppliers has not
had the same success however. On one hand, there
are not enough trained personnel. Despite having
multiple institutions working on it, many potential
supply companies from the aerospace value chain
do not have appropriate certification, due to the
investment costs and trained personnel required
up front. In this sense, Mexico is still remote from
the market interactions of competitive countries.
Brazilian aerospace companies, for example,
receive à la carte credits from the Banca de
Desarrollo (BNDES) (Development Bank) while
smaller companies from Mexico do not have the
technological, financial, or managerial capacities
to qualify for loans as viable risk partners.16
Figure 1, below, depicts the ecology of an
important support network created with a
governmental eye toward specialized worker
training, research, and knowledge transfer. This
AI network, with its potential for cultivating
information exchanges and new products, is a sign
of commitment from both state and private actors.
It carries the hopes in some sense for future
foreign investment and consolidation of the
Aerospace sector in Queretaro, Mexico.
FINAL REFLECTIONS
In this work, the efforts of different agents
to incorporate and expand the Aerospace sector
(AI) in Mexico have been identified. In

elaborating this complex web of interests and
dynamics among participating actors, two basic
claims have been made:
1) On one hand, the process of production and
organizational management in AI, which
determines the level of international
competitiveness reached, has been characterized
by mergers, new acquisitions, and continuous
international engagement to maintain competitive
advantages. In the Aerospace sector, the local
entrepreneurial network of suppliers links through
an assembler that operates as leading company
and establishes vital connections to the outside
world. This sector leader organization in Mexico
allowed companies to enter the aerospace business
at multiple access points along the global value
chain.
2) On the other hand, the case of Mexico,
especially in the state of Queretaro, shows how
national and state policies combine with the
efforts of small companies and larger businesses
to create favorable conditions for development
and growth of the Aerospace sector, articulating
effective networks to link with research and
specialized training that can meet international
standards.
ProMexico and the Ministry of Economy played
an important role as trailblazers of specialized
demand, promoting the insertion of anchor
companies in a sector of strategic importance for
the country. Conacyt, through various national
programs, has strived to strengthen the demand
for knowledge, together with state-level
institutions (UNAQ, CEDIA) and Public Research
Centers (Cidesi, Ciateq, Cideteq,CIAT ) that, in
addition to supporting joint public-private
research projects, provided training for highly
qualified personnel in AI.

16

Flor Brown and Lilia Dominguez-Villalobos,
“¿Tiene la industria aeronáutica mexicana las
condiciones para integrarse a la cadena de valor
internacional de alto valor agregado? (Does the
Mexican aeronautical industry have the conditions to
become part of the international value chain of high
added value?).” In Casalet Monica, La Industria
Aeroespacial. Complejidad Productiva E Institucional
(The Aerospace Industry. Productive and Institutional
Complexity). (DF, Mexico: FLACSO and Conacyt,
April 2013), pp. 135-162.

Changes in the design of public policies can
support new strategies to promote priority sectors.
In the case of Aerospace, ProMexico’s studies
transcended the macroeconomic dimension, for
they included programs and proactive incentives
to generate changes in the structural nature of
institutions, in the behavior of companies, and in
the scientific community. This expanded scope of
activity for public policy was nevertheless
anchored around strategic objectives:
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1) Establishing growth priorities in productive
sectors.
2) Promoting the proliferation of public-private
networks of collaboration on a regional and
sectoral level, stimulating the formation of
industrial clusters.
3) Favoring the mobility of post-graduate students
and researchers in companies within priority
sectors such as Aerospace.
4) Generating public support to increase capacity
of companies to innovate, improve productivity
and quality, and restructure networks for
transforming educational institutions, public
research centers, and technology institutes.
The preliminary success of these initiatives
indicates that across-the-board, broad brush
policies are not sufficient. Selective policies are
necessary, oriented towards defining a
specialization profile, or niche, across the global
value chain of a high-tech industrial sector.
Despite progress in the creation of public
programs to support Mexico Aerospace, obstacles
persist in systematization of information on results
(“sector assessment”), and on the effectiveness of
communication and collaboration initiated
between companies and specialized researchers.
Improved coordination implies strategic action for
the future growth of Mexico Aerospace that goes
beyond current innovations in government policy.
In this vein, two policy objectives are
fundamental: ensuring financial resources for
incorporation of local suppliers, and strengthening
management of specialized knowledge. For these,
it is necessary to have more information to track
the different stages of various regional
concentrations in AI; the needs for leading
companies in each region; and the coincidence
among national and regional policies for
integrating local suppliers into the global value
chain.
Systematized data is lacking to design a
comprehensive strategy that fully integrates
private companies; the public sector; linked
intermediate institutions; educational institutions;
and public-private research centers. Such an
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information-intensive strategy could prove
indispensable to diverse actors within the AI
support network for resolving specific problems
posed by the Aerospace sector in Mexico – and
for capturing any lessons beneficial to the cause of
international development in general.
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TABLE I: Main Aerospace Clusters in Mexico1

MAIN CLUSTERS
In Baja California
 Mexicali
 Tecate
 Tijuana

1

SPECIALTY
Electric-Electronic
Parts manufacturing.

In Chihuahua:
 Chihuahua
 Ciudad Juarez

Manufacturing of parts and
fuselages, electric-electronic,
mechanized interiors.

In Queretaro
 Queretaro

Manufacturing
of
motor
components and landing gear.
Assembly of components and
airplane fuselages, MRO.

In Sonora
 Hermosillo
 Guaymas
 Ciudad Obregon

Manufacturing of components
for motors and turbines,
fuselage
and
composite
materials.

In Nuevo Leon
 Apodaca
 Monterrey
 Santa Catarina

Forging
and
machining,
manufacturing of components,
assembly of fuselages for
helicopters.

MAIN PLAYERS
51 companies among which these
stand out:
 Honeywell
 Gulfstream Interiores Aéreos
(Air Interiors)
28 companies among which these
stand out:
 Labinal, de Grupo Safran
 Cessna Aircraft
 Textron International
 Grupo American Industries
32 companies among which these
stand out:
 Bombardier
 ITP Ingeniería y Fabricación.
 SNECMA, from Grupo Safran
 GE-IQ
 Aernova
43 companies among which these
stand out:
 Goodrich Aerostructures of
Mexico
 ESCO
29 companies among which these
stand out:
 Frisa Forjados
 MD Helicopters.

Secretaría de Economía (Ministry of Economy), Dirección General de Industrias Pesadas y de Alta Tecnología
(General Management of Heavy Industries and High Technology), Industria Aeronáutica en México (Aeronautical
Industry in Mexico), June 2011, pp. 54.
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TABLE II: Institutional Framework for Strengthening Mexico Aerospace2

PUBLIC AGENTS

National/Civil Bodies
Ministry of Economy

PROGRAM

Sectoral program 2007-2012

SME (small and medium
sized companies) fund.

ProMexico.

Dirección General de
Aviación Civil (DGAC)
(General Management
of Civil Aviation),
assigned to the Ministry
of Communication and
Transport.

Conacyt. (National
S&T Council).

2

Productive linking program.
National Program for
Trailblazing Companies.
Alliance model with
transnational companies.
Aeronautical authority.
1950 first regulations for civil
aircraft; Regulation for
Aeronautical
Telecommunications and
Radio Asst.; Regulation for
Search and Salvage.
1952 Mexico signed an
agreement with the ICAO.
Supervises daily operations of
the sector.
Programa Estímulos a la
innovación (PEI) (Innovation
Stimulus Program).
Innova SME programs.
Pro Innova.
Innovatec.

PRINCIPAL ACTIONS
Formation of productive chains;
Company partnerships; Supply
creation; Technological export and
reconversion of sectors; Company
boosting; Factors
Financing.
Company management.
Technological innovation.
Training.
Commercialization.
Strengthen value chains in Mexico.
Link suppliers with supplies in
global chains.
Increase national supply and
exports.
Applied in multiple automobile and
aeronautical companies.
Initiatives to generate prospective
studies of industrial sectors.
Verify aeronautical and airport
security measures (Safety and
Security).
Guard airports, issue permits,
authorizations, licenses and
certificates to air transport
companies.
Compile information and statistics
about air transport.
Financial support programs for big
companies, SMEs and
C.P.I.(Engineering Preparatory
Courses) to generate jobs linked to
innovation.
Support for aerospace and
aeronautical sectors.

Based on author interviews and analysis of documents from said institutions.
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PUBLIC AGENTS

Agencia Espacial
Mexicana (AEM)
(Mexican Space
Agency)

PROGRAM

-

-

PRINCIPAL ACTIONS

Alianzas estratégicas de redes
de innovación para la
competitividad (AERIS)
(Strategic alliances of
networks of innovation for
competitiveness).This
program ended but it was
important to boost the
formation of aerospace
clusters.

Interinstitutional coordination to
stimulate innovation networks.
Prospective and market studies.

Thematic networks.

Exchange platform between
researchers, entrepreneurs and the
public sector.

Red Temática de
Conocimientos Tecnológicos
Espaciales (RTCTE)
(Thematic Network for
Technological Space
Knowledge).

Competitiveness of the mexican
aerospace industry UNAM, IPN,
Ciateq, Cicese, UABC, INAOE,
Global Star Mexico, Satmex, AMC,
Cinvestav (Guadalajara).

Law created in 2010

Construction of a work agenda with
public and private actors and
academics in order to elaborate a
state policy in the matter of space,
for training, scientific research and
space development.

Consejo Mexicano de
Educación Aeroespacial
(Comea) (Mexican
1st national academic
Council of Aerospace
research network linked with
Education), autonomous the aerospace sector.
academic body, created
in 2007.
International Bodies
(PNUD) Mexico

50

Analysis of the aerospace industry.
Determine professional
competitiveness.
Program for joint updating and
training (Comea and Femia).

Methodology to reduce the learning
curve and generate a greater impact
in the training of human resources.
SME integration into the aerospace,
Special processes certification
automobile, electric and electronic
program.
sectors.
Collaboration agreement with Mexican SMEs and European
the Programa Integral de
companies collaboration, aerospace
Apoyo a las Pymes
sector jointly with Femia.
(Piapyme) (Integral Support
Certification of space processes for
Program for SMEs) MexicoSMEs.
European Union.
Nadcap standards, SAE, AS9100.
Program for supplier
development.

-

-

-

-
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PUBLIC AGENTS

PROGRAM

PRINCIPAL ACTIONS

Entrepreneurial
bodies with
public/private action.
Federación Mexicana
de la Industria
Aeroespacial (Femia)
(Mexican Federation for
the Aerospace
Industry), non-profit
civil partnership (2007).

Establish a strategic national
aerospace plan. Support
integration of the national
aerospace industry.
Obtain incentives and tariffs
for aerospace products.
Events and seminars.

Products for maintenance and
manufacture.
Analysis of legislative trends in the
matter.
Diagnosis of the sector on an
international and national level.
Lobbying to organize a sole
government agency in charge of
acquisitions in the sector.

Intermediate
organizations with
state and national
action

Fundación MéxicoEstados Unidos para la
Ciencia (Fumec)(U.S.Mexico Foundation for
Science.

Programs in emerging niches
with high potential.

TechBa – Business
accelerator program (SE)
(Ministry of Economy).

Support for the aerospace sector:
Diagnosis of strengths and
opportunities.
Financial advice to link companies
with investments.
Consultancy to advice an
international business – ICT,
financial plans and manufacturing.
Linking with TechBa for business
units in Seattle and Montreal.
TechBa is installed in highly
competitive strategic environments:
Silicon Valley, Austria, Montreal,
Madrid, Michigan, Vancouver,
Seattle.
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TABLE III: Trailblazing Companies in the State of Queretaro3

Trailblazing
companies

Aernova

Industrias
Turborrectores
(ITR)

Motives for
installation in
Mexico

Principal products
Aeronautical
structures: design,
development,
certification test,
prototypes and active
support.
Manufacturing of
composite and metal
parts.
Assembly plant.
Metal components
plant.

Interest in the
American aerospace
market.
Facility in Mexico as
part of FTA.
Interest in creating a
currency mix dollar,
euro, peso.

Precedent of commercial
relations of the state of
Queretaro with the Basque
Country’s Autonomous
Community, where the
company is from.
Training of workers; some
were sent to Spain.
Active exchange with Femia.
Uses CENAN’s test
laboratories in Queretaro.
Supports training programs
from the UNAQ.

Air transport,
engineering,
manufacturing and
maintenance of gas
turbines.

Closeness of Mexico
with the United
States’ market,
Mexico’s
participation in
NAFTA, facility to
save on tariffs.

Manufacturing of the first
static seal T900 motor in
Mexico.

Work was moved from
Toronto to Mexico,
manufacturing of harnesses
and electric systems for
Challenger 300, 605, 850, 870,
890 models.
Active relationship with the
UNAQ.
Integrated few direct Mexican
suppliers because of
certification problems.

Heads French-Mexican
campus of aviation.
Active participation in the
UNAQ.

Bombardier:
three plants

Manufacturing of
regional aircraft,
executive jets.

Reduction in
production costs.
Importance of
Mexico’s
participation in the
integration of the
FTA, with Japan and
the EU.

Grupo Safran:
eight production
and maintenance
plants in
Mexico.
Messier Services
Messier Dowty
Sncema
Sames in
Queretaro

Aeronautical
propulsion and
equipping, defense
and security.
MRO landing gears
with machining and
treatment.
Generation of
biofuels.

Interest because of
Mexico’s
participation in
NAFTA.
Maintenance of
Airbus 320 and
Boeing 737
components.

3

Competitive opportunity in
Queretaro

From author interviews conducted with said companies.
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Figure 1: Institutional Network Supporting the Aerospace Cluster in Queretaro4

4

Information provided by Casalet, M. 2013.

The Centro de Ingeniería Avanzada en Turbomáquinas (CIAT) (Center of Advanced Engineering in Turbomachines) began its activities as an
engineering services provider for General Electric (GE), specifically assisting two companies that belong to GE—GE Power Systems and GE
Aircraft Engines—with design, drawing, engineering, and analysis activities. The CIAT evolved into the biggest and most important aviation
engineering center outside the United States, as part of a global network of development centers from GE.
El Centro de Desarrollo de la Industria Aeronáutica (CEDIA) (Development Center of the Aeronautical Industry) depends on the Tecnológico
de Monterrey, Queretaro Campus. Among its objectives are development of the aeronautical industry and training of high-level professionals.
CEDIA also offers solutions to technical problems for companies that seek to become part of the chain of production in AI.
The Universidad Nacional Aeronáutica de Querétaro (UNAQ) (The National Aeronautical University of Queretaro): Created in 2007 to
respond to the needs of highly skilled labor, it has teaching personnel from aerospace companies (OEM, Tier 1) and the support of Public
Research Centers such as the Centro de Ingeniería y Desarrollo Industrial (Cidesi) (Center of Industrial Engineering and Development). Oriented
towards electronic and advanced manufacturing, the Centro de Investigación y Asistencia Técnica del Estado de Queretaro A.C. (Ciateq)
(Technical Research and Assistance Center of the State of Queretaro) offers technical training to companies and technical assistance services
specialized in measuring systems, machinery and equipment design, monitoring and control systems, process engineering, and advanced
manufacturing. The Centro de Investigación y Desarrollo Tecnológico en Electroquímica (Cideteq) (Center for Technological Research and
Development in Electrochemistry) offers accredited services to the industry in chemical analysis, material analysis, and environmental
technologies.
Laboratorio de Pruebas y Tecnología Aeronáutica (LaBTA) (Aeronautical Testing and Technology Laboratory): Created jointly by the Cidesi,
Ciateq, and Cideteq, it has support from Conacyt and the State of Queretaro to carry out specialized services for aeronautical companies. LabTA
offers laboratory services (chemical analysis of materials and composites, physical-chemical and behavior testing in services of composite
materials, vibration diagnosis, and noise analysis) and assistance in product development, including design and manufacturing of testing
prototypes and devices (design and manufacturing of process and testing equipment; design of metal, polymers, and composite products;
design, manufacturing and activation of testing devices: hydraulics, pneumatics, mechanical, and fatigue).
Red de Investigación e Innovación Aeroespacial del Estado de Querétaro (RIIAQ) (Aerospace Research and Innovation Network of the State
of Queretaro) emerged in calls by Conacyt to stimulate the formation of alliances between public and private agents in critical areas of
knowledge, research, and creation of productive capacities. RIIAQ led to the formation of the Aerospace Cluster in Queretaro financed by OEMs
and made up of companies, public research centers, and intermediate companies in Queretaro (Casalet, 2013, op. cit.).

Essays

Book Review
Crowded Orbits: Conflict and Cooperation in Space
by James Clay Moltz (Columbia University Press, 2014)
Deron Jackson
A popular space primer serves both the policy and academic communities.
Human beings have perceived outer space
as infinite for centuries, and since the observations
of Edwin Hubble in the 1920s, scientists have
studied phenomena that suggest the universe itself
is expanding. However, as the title of Clay
Moltz’s most recent book points out, the region of
space most important to the economic and
physical security of residents on Earth is
increasingly viewed as far from infinite.
In Crowded Orbits, the author introduces readers
to the many ways in which orbital space around
the Earth is in fact distinctly limited by principles
of physics as well as politics. This discussion is
of value not only to scholars and students of space
policy but to those concerned more broadly with
questions of international cooperation and conflict
in the early 21st Century. Our journal, Space and
Defense, represents the Eisenhower Center’s
continuing effort to broaden scholarship on issues
of space policy and security. With the publication
of Crowded Orbits, Clay Moltz again
demonstrates his leadership as a scholar and
expert in this field, which has already benefitted
from his previous books: Asia’s Space Race
(2011) and two editions of The Politics of Space
Security: Strategic Restraint and the Pursuit of
National Interests (2008 and 2011).
The first hurdle encountered in presenting space
security issues to a wider audience, to include
those in the policy-making community, is dealing
with a subject that requires a certain degree of
understanding of abstract scientific principles.
This challenge is addressed in the first chapter of
Crowded Orbits. There Moltz surveys
characteristics of the orbital domain which make
it intrinsically different from land, sea, or air as
venues for human activity. Understanding these
principles helps explain why orbital space can be
considered “crowded,” as the title suggests,
whether from the perspective of the limits of the

electromagnetic spectrum used to gather and
communicate information with satellites or the
three distinct orbits they inhabit. Moltz gives his
readers just enough of an overview of the
scientific principles in order to make sense of the
political challenges discussed in greater detail in
the chapters that follow. Those interested in more
science can consult The Physics of Space Security
by Wright, Grego, and Gronlund (Cambridge,
MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences,
2005), which is the near perfect complement of
Moltz’s approach, beginning with one section on
policy implications and following up with twelve
sections discussing technical operations in space.
While the description of orbital space as “crowded”
takes top billing in the title, in reality the book’s
real emphasis is not so much on what contributes
to that congestion but on the political implications
of that congestion as evidenced by the subtitle:
Conflict and Cooperation. Both conflict and
cooperation are possible outcomes from operating
in a space environment that the United States has
called both “congested” and “contested” in its
recent space strategy documents. The dual nature
of conflict and cooperation in space is not a new
development, as outlined in Moltz’s second
chapter which charts the politics of the space age.
The use of space by the United States and Soviet
Union was made possible through development of
long-range ballistic missiles primarily intended
for delivery of nuclear weapons. However,
discovery of the effects of nuclear weapons on the
space environment led to the first arms control
treaty of the Cold War, the Partial Test Ban Treaty
(PTBT) of 1963, which banned further
atmospheric testing (p. 40). Although their
terrestrial arms race and intense political strategic
competition continued throughout the 1960s and
70s, the two superpowers were nonetheless able to
establish the basic international legal framework
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governing activity in space, in particular the 1967
Outer Space Treaty (OST).
The OST and other agreements which followed it
represent a high water mark in the use of formal
treaties to regulate space activity, a practice that
has declined in recent decades. Although certain
aspects of the cooperative paradigm established
by the OST have continued, when the Cold War
heated up one last time at the end of the 1970s and
into the 1980s, the prospect for conflict in space
began to rise. Both the U.S. and U.S.S.R.
engaged in testing anti-satellite weapons (ASATs)
and debated the role of space systems in
defending against ballistic missiles (p. 50). Such
weapons were never used against the other side,
however, and the framework for space established
in the first half of the Cold War was still intact
when the Berlin Wall was torn down and the
Soviet Union passed into the dustbin of history.
It may very well be time to consign the term
“post-Cold War” to that same historical dustbin
and search for a new label to assign the world of
today, which has seen significant changes in the
number and nature of the actors and challenges
confronting leaders and citizens in the 21st
Century. Although the nature of the physical
environment of space is inherently the same in
2016 as it was in 1957, 1967, or 1989, the
political environment is transforming rapidly.
The number of states with the capability to launch
objects into orbit has continued to grow, and the
number that make use of space for civil,
commercial, or military purposes has expanded
far beyond the elite club of two space-faring states
in the late 1950s. Compounding the problem of
crowded orbits is the advance of technology
making possible the proliferation of even smaller
satellites, down to the size of “picosats” weighing
in at only one kilogram (p. 103). While these new
systems make it possible to lower the cost of
exploring and using space, they simultaneously
complicate the political problem of “crowded
orbits” by raising the number of objects in play.

A one-kilogram picosat may be viewed as an
innovative platform for allowing students or
emerging nations to study the uses of space for
their first time; this same satellite may be viewed
by an established operator as “debris.” Among
the questions to be answered is how to ensure the
increasing number of small vehicles do not collide
with larger (and more expensive) satellites
operated by governments or private companies.
What degree of responsibility must be borne by
any satellite operator to ensure their vehicle does
not collide with another while active and is
removed from orbit when it reaches the end of its
useful life? Although the United States leads the
international community in tracking orbital debris
and providing data to avoid collisions, America is
neither a global policeman nor an orbital garbage
collector. Debris mitigation and remediation
remain tasks requiring a cooperative response
from all spacefaring states, working against the
temptation to be a “free rider” and leave the
consequences to other nations or future
generations.
As Moltz draws toward his concluding chapter on
“Trends and Future Options,” a number of
questions emerge out of the preceding sections for
consideration, which may prompt individual states
to work cooperatively to avoid conflict and find
their “SALT moment,” as discussed in this issue’s
essay by our publisher. Will crowded orbits place
pressure or limits on military activity as more
states integrate the use of space into their armed
forces? Civil space activities have been one area
of cooperation among allies and between former
adversaries. However, it is possible that the civil
sector may see a trend toward re-nationalization,
away from collaborative projects and back toward
national space programs working alone. It is also
possible we will see de-nationalization of space
activities with a rise in privately funded ventures
aiming at putting humans in orbit and eventually
on Mars. The reality is we will probably see more
of both, making the urgency for dealing politically
with Crowded Orbits even more critical.

Essays

Publisher’s Corner
Space Policy’s SALT Moment
Roger G. Harrison
The market for a leap forward in space arms control is open. Now, who’s buying?
The United States is facing a fundamental
decision about space policy which arises from a
question: does our national interest in an ordered
space environment trump our absolute insistence
on a policy of freedom of action? Or is the
looming threat of over-crowded orbits, frequency
interference and debris – of contested, congested
and competitive space – so pressing that we must
accept some greater transparency for our national
security space operations, even greater
information sharing with China, Russia, and
commercial space operators, and perhaps some
limits as well on activities affecting satellites in
orbit?

But national satellite operators are not party to the
SDA, and not governed by its provisions.
Commercial companies saw reason to be more
transparent about the location and functioning of
their satellites because it was good business; like
any frontier, including frontiers opened by new
technology, the era of the gunslinger had to yield
to the more settled and more sustainable era of
law and order; anarchy in space might have been
acceptable when the domain was still relatively
empty. But gunslingers still lurk down every ally
in national security space. The commercial
example is therefore no precedent.

A reader familiar with space operations will
immediately object that freedom of action in
space is more apparent than real. In fact, space is
a heavily regulated environment, where most
operators observe a host of rules most of the time.
The question is, rather, whether the current,
largely voluntary regulatory environment is robust
or comprehensive enough to cope with an overall
satellite population growing ever larger and more
technically and politically complex?

Some impetus toward order nevertheless applies
to national space actors. The same conditions of
increasing debris, crowded orbits, and
electromagnetic interference apply to them; all
swim in the same increasingly polluted stream.
But there are obvious inhibitions to self-restriction,
which apply particularly to national actors.
Threats to profits are a minor matter compared to
threats to national security. So while the SDA has
been a success and shown the way, there are other
problems that may inhibit the major national
players from joining the fold.

The crisis point has not yet been reached.
Disputes about things like assigned frequencies
and orbital position are still relatively rare and,
with some exceptions, peacefully resolved. The
commercial players in particular are a great deal
more cooperative with each other than they were
even ten years ago, a phenomenon exemplified by
the Space Data Association, an information
sharing agreement to which companies operating
90% of satellites in orbit are now party. Thanks
to the agreement establishing the SDA, there are
for the first time real penalties for disruptive
activities in orbit, which can amount to tens of
millions of dollars in particularly egregious cases.
The result is a much more orderly environment for
commercial activity in space than ever existed
before.

These begin with mutual suspicion. The eras of
relative progress in international space
cooperation have coincided – roughly speaking –
with eras of increased cooperation within the
atmosphere. Indeed, sometimes, as in the Nixon
Administration, space was used as a stalking horse
for detente. The first high profile instance of
U.S.-Soviet scientific collaboration, emerging
from the depths of the Cold War, was the joint
mission bringing U.S. and Soviet astronauts to the
orbiting manned Soviet Soyuz satellite in 1972.
Cooperation on the International Space Station,
which flourished after the demise of the old Soviet
Union, was a great leap forward in the same
direction, and has continued even as relations
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between a resurgent Russia and a wary United
States have worsened.
To this must be added the debut of a new and very
secretive China to the list of major actors in space.
China’s policy has for the last decade explicitly
rejected the idea of greater transparency, not to
mention any hint of restrictions on freedom of
action. “We are like a man with a knife; you are
like a man with a gun.” No American who has
dealt with a Chinese interlocutor has been spared
this fatuous simile. Those Chinese having
interaction with the West on space – which means,
those who parrot but hardly influence Chinese
policy – use that line as an all-purpose response to
any initiative from the United States for greater
information sharing about space. These smiling
individuals repeat to the point of exasperation that
the Chinese cannot hold transparency discussions
with the United States until they achieve parity in
space, to include control of space on the
peripheries of their country.
Whatever parity means – and this is never detailed
– the goal of achieving it seems to be ever
receding into the future. And control of space on
the peripheries of the Central Kingdom means the
capability of controlling it everywhere. In short,
Chinese policy on space is as proprietorial and
aggressive as that of the most hardline and
paranoid of American space control advocates. It
doesn’t take much to imagine that knife about
which they prattle slipping silently between our
ribs.
Donald Rumsfeld was once presented with a
policy paper that described space as a “commons.”
The word apparently conjured for the Defense
Secretary an image of flower children in
communes; it is claimed by those who suffered his
wrath on that occasion that as soon as he
encountered the word, their cause was lost. It
isn’t, of course, the only thing Secretary Rumsfeld
got wrong. Space is a commons for better or
worse.

The present Administration recognized this early
on. The word “cooperation” appears 13 times in
the first Obama Administration space policy
document, and the word “collaboration” twice.
“Space Control,” on the other hand – the mantra
of the neo-conservatives who tried and failed to
make it a reality – appears only once, in an annex.
There was hope as this new Administration took
office that the other major space actors would see
the same looming danger we did. Since we were
far and away the predominate power in space, and
since we depended on no one except ourselves for
space situational awareness, our willingness to
cooperate should have been seized on by the other
actors.
That didn’t happen. The United States leaned
forward almost to the point of toppling over on
space with the PRC, only to be greeted with
implacability, impenetrable suspicion, and some
nonsense about knives and guns. There might
have been a new beginning with President Xi.
Instead, the lines of communication on space –
never humming – went completely dead. And so
the situation remains. The EU tried to jump start
a dialogue about sensible order in space by
proposing vague and entirely voluntary “rules of
the road,” which were far less onerous and
restrictive than mandatory limitations of the Outer
Space Treaty to which all major players were
statutorily bound. Repeated offers to further
empty the new “rules” of content failed to create
the barest hint of consensus.
It is tempting – indeed, it is almost required – to
conclude that international cooperation in space
will not soon move beyond the stage it has
reached. The momentum seems to be in the
opposite direction. What can change? A change
in Chinese attitudes would give some hope; but
there is no sign of that. Some grand disaster
affecting everyone and showing the vulnerabilities
and weaknesses of the current structure may be
necessary. While we await that catastrophe,
whatever it may be, the present, deeply flawed
system will just have to cope. RGH
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